Chuuk v. Weno Municipality
20 FSM R. 582 (Chk. 2016)

FSM SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2015-1008

CHUUK STATE,
Plaintiff,

vs.

WENO MUNICIPALITY, THE FEDERATED
STATES OF MICRONESIA, and THE ECHEN
NAKAMURA LINEAGE of Iras Village, Weno
Island, Chuuk,
Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Dennis K. Yamase
Chief Justice

Decided: August 25, 2016

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:
Sabino S. Asor, Esq.
Chuuk Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 1050
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

For the Defendant (FSM):
Leonito Bacalando, Jr., Esq.
Caroline Rugero, Esq.
Assistant Attorneys General
FSM Department of Justice
P.O. Box PS-105
Palikir, Pohnpei FM 96941

For the Defendant (Nakamura lineage):
Salomon M. Saimon, Esq.
Directing Attorney
Micronesian Legal Services Corporation
P.O. Box 129
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941

* * * *

HEADNOTES
Civil Procedure - Motions - Unopposed
When there is no timely opposition filed after proper service of a motion, the adverse party is deemed to have consented to the motion, but even then, the court still needs good grounds before it can grant the motion. Chuuk v. Weno Municipality, 20 FSM R. 582, 584 (Chk. 2016).
Constitutional Law - Interpretation
The general principle is that constitutional adjudication should be avoided unless necessary, so the trial court should first consider any non-constitutional grounds that might resolve the issue. Chuuk v. Weno Municipality, 20 FSM R. 582, 584 (Chk. 2016).
Civil Procedure - Dismissal - Before Responsive Pleading
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, only the well-pled or well-pleaded facts are to be accepted as true. The court will not assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations since legal allegations masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss. Chuuk v. Weno Municipality, 20 FSM R. 582, 584 (Chk. 2016).
Property - Public Lands; Transition of Authority
Under a plain reading of Secretarial Order 2969, Trust Territory public lands were transferred to the respective Trust Territory districts, and thus Trust Territory public lands on Weno were earlier transferred to the Truk District government. Although, on July 12, 1979, when the FSM Constitution took effect, any Trust Territory government interest in property was transferred to the FSM for retention or distribution in accordance with the FSM Constitution, public land on Weno was not Trust Territory government property since all Trust Territory public land there had already been transferred to the Truk district government. It would thus have been Truk district government property. Chuuk v. Weno Municipality, 20 FSM R. 582, 584-85 (Chk. 2016).
Civil Procedure - Dismissal - Before Responsive Pleading; Jurisdiction - Exclusive FSM Supreme Court
When the FSM was not a successor-in-interest to the lands in question because, as a matter of law, the Trust Territory government never transferred to the FSM national government any of the Trust Territory's interest in that land; when the only basis, asserted or apparent, for the FSM Supreme Court's jurisdiction is that the FSM national government is a party; and when the FSM was never properly a party because it had no interest in the land, the plaintiff has not stated a claim over which the FSM Supreme Court can exercise jurisdiction or for which it can grant relief and the FSM's motion to dismiss will therefore be granted and the FSM is dismissed and since the court never had jurisdiction over the case, it is dismissed without prejudice to any proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction. Chuuk v. Weno Municipality, 20 FSM R. 582, 585 (Chk. 2016).
* * * *

COURT'S OPINION
DENNIS K. YAMASE, Chief Justice:
There are two motions to dismiss now before the court. One, from the Echen Nakamura Lineage of Iras Village, challenges subject-matter jurisdiction (and alternatively, moves to disqualify the Chuuk Attorney General's Office from representing the plaintiff, State of Chuuk). The other, from the Federated States of Micronesia, also challenges subject-matter jurisdiction but further asserts that Chuuk's complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Chuuk did not file an opposition to either motion. When there is no timely opposition filed after proper service of a motion, the adverse party is deemed to have consented to the motion. FSM Civ. R. 6(d); FSM Dev. Bank v. Christopher Corp., 20 FSM R. 98, 103 (Chk. 2015). But even then, the court still needs good grounds before it can grant the motion. Senda v. Mid-Pacific Constr. Co., 6 FSM R. 440, 442 (App. 1994); Lee v. Lee, 13 FSM R. 68, 71 (Chk. 2004).
This lawsuit involves land (Lot Nos. 012-A-26 and 012-A-27 on Weno) that at various times was owned, or claimed to be owned, by the Echen Nakamura Lineage, Moen [later renamed Weno] Municipality, the Trust Territory government, and the Chuuk state government. See Nakamura v. Moen Municipality, 15 FSM R. 213 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2007); Nakamura v. Moen Municipality, 8 FSM R. 552 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 1998); Nakamura v. Moen Municipality, 7 FSM R. 375 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1996). Chuuk asserts that it has a perpetual right to possess the land, that it has been deprived of that property right, and, through this suit, Chuuk seeks to regain that right or to be indemnified for that loss and any losses stemming from it. Chuuk also alleges that "the defendant Federated States of Micronesia is one of the successors in interest of the Trust Territory Government to the lands in question by virtue of the referenced Secretarial orders above in conjunction with the Transition Provision of its FSM Constitution." Compl. for Declaratory J., Equitable & Injunctive Relief & for Specific Performance at 7 (June 26, 2015).
The two challenges to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction raise issues that would require constitutional interpretation and adjudication. "[T]he general principle [is] that constitutional adjudication should be avoided unless necessary, [so] the trial court should first consider any non-constitutional grounds that might resolve the issue." Pohnpei v. AHPW, Inc., 14 FSM R. 1, 25-26 (App. 2006) (citing Kosrae v. Langu, 9 FSM R. 243, 251 (App. 1999); Jonah v. FSM, 5 FSM R. 308, 314 (App. 1992)). Thus, the court will first consider the FSM's motion to dismiss for the failure to state a claim.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, only the well-pled or well-pleaded facts are to be accepted as true, and the court will not assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations since legal allegations masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss. Arthur v. Pohnpei, 16 FSM R. 581, 593 (Pon. 2009). Chuuk's assertion that the FSM "is one of the successors in interest of the Trust Territory Government to the lands in question" is a legal conclusion cast in the form of a factual allegation.
Under a plain reading of Secretarial Order 2969 (Dec. 28, 1974) (a copy of which was attached to the complaint), the Trust Territory public lands were transferred to the respective Trust Territory districts, and thus Trust Territory public lands on Weno were transferred to the Truk District government. Furthermore, Secretarial Order 2969, Amendment No. 1 (Dec. 20, 1978) (also attached to the complaint) specifically provided that Trust Territory public lands in Chuuk were to be conveyed to the Chartered Truk District Government. Thus, although "[a]n interest in property held by the Government of the Trust Territory [wa]s transferred to the Federated States of Micronesia for retention or distribution in accordance with th[e FSM] Constitution," FSM Const. art. XV, § 3, any public land on Weno was not Trust Territory government property on July 12, 1979, when the FSM Constitution took effect since all Trust Territory public land there had already been transferred to the Truk district government. It would thus have been Truk district government property. The Chuuk state government is the legal successor to the Truk district government. The FSM is therefore not a successor-in-interest to the lands in question.
There is thus no basis, even taking the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true, for the FSM to be a party to this lawsuit since, as a matter of law, the Trust Territory government never transferred to the FSM national government any of the Trust Territory's interest in the land in question.
The FSM's motion to dismiss for the failure to state a claim against the FSM is therefore granted and the FSM is dismissed. Since the only basis, asserted or apparent, for the court's jurisdiction is that the FSM national government is a party, and since the FSM was never properly a party, Chuuk has not stated a claim over which the FSM Supreme Court can exercise jurisdiction or for which the court can grant relief. Since the court never had jurisdiction over this case, it is dismissed without prejudice to any proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction.