IN THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL CASE NO: 182 OF 2024

STATE
Applicant

v.

NEIL PRAKASH SHARMA
First Respondent

JOSAIA VOREQE BAINIMARAMA
Second Respondent

AIYAZ SAYED-KHAIYUM
Third Respondent
													   
Before						:	Senior Resident Magistrate Sufia Hamza
Counsel for the Applicant			: 	DPP’s Office, Suva
Counsel for the First Respondent		:	Howards Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent		:	R Patel Lawyers
Counsel for the Third Respondent		:	R Patel Lawyers
Date of Hearing				:	10th June 2025	
Date of Ruling					:	12th June 2025

RULING ON APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER TO HIGH COURT 

[1]	The first respondent is charged with the first and second counts of Abuse of Office contrary to section 139 of the Crimes Act, third and fourth counts of Breach of Trust by Person employed in the Public Service contrary to section 200 of the Crimes Act.  The second respondent is charged with the fifth count of Abuse of Office contrary to section 139 of the Crimes Act.  The third respondent is charged with the sixth count of Abuse of Office contrary to section 139 of the Crimes Act and seventh count of Obstructing the Course of Justice contrary to section 190(e) of the Crimes Act.  As the respondents are facing certain offences which are indictable offences triable summarily, they have elected to be tried in the Magistrates Court.    

[2]	Bearing in mind the constitutional rights of the respondents to have their matter determined within a reasonable time pursuant to section 15(3) of the Constitution, the hearing dates for this matter is set from 4th August 2025 to 8th August 2025, 18th August 2025 to 22nd August 2025 and 25th August 2025 to 29th August 2025.  

[3]	By way of notice of motion and affidavit dated 13th May 2025, the State has now made an application for an order that the High Court has original jurisdiction to hear and determine any question relating to the interpretation or application of section 163 of the Constitution and that this matter be transferred to the High Court for the purpose of trial.  The State has relied on sections 188 and 191 of the Criminal Procedure Act.   
The respective Defence Counsel for the respondents have filed their affidavits in opposition to the application.

Relevant Provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 

[4]	Section 188(2) (a) (b) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that:

“Before the calling of evidence at trial, an application may be made by a public prosecutor or police prosecutor that the case is one which should be tried by the High Court, and upon such an application the magistrate shall - 

(a)	hear and consider the reasons for the application;

(b)	hear and consider any submissions made on behalf of the accused person as to the most appropriate court to hear and determine the charges; and 

(c)	otherwise determine matters relevant to the grounds for the application –

and may continue to hear the case (unless the charges are of a nature that may be tried only by the High Court) or transfer the case to the High Court under Division 3 of this Part.”

[5]	Section 191 of the Criminal Procedure Act states that:

		“A magistrate may transfer any charges or proceedings to the High Court.”
		
Affidavit in Support by the State 

[6]	The affidavit in evidence of Ms. Tikoisuva, Acting Director of Public Prosecutions, Suva is reproduced as follows:

•	THAT I depose this affidavit from facts within my own knowledge and capacity, save except where it is according to information received by me or upon reasonable belief. 

•	THAT I have worked in the legal profession in Fiji for over 20 years.

•	THAT I am aware of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 182 of 2024 having being briefed by the Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions, Ms. Tabuakuro in the course of the proceedings and as the DPP having supervisory authority over all prosecution cases. 

•	THAT I am the case officer for State v Sayed-Khaiyum & Saneem in Criminal Case No. 548 of 2023.

•	THAT I was also the case officer for Bainimarama & Qiliho in the Fiji Court of Appeal case pending in the appellate court. 

•	THAT the State seek transfer of this matter to the High Court for trial because the interpretation and application of section 163 of the Constitution will be a trial issue. 

•	THAT section 163 of the Constitution provides a definition of civil service which is different to the definition of persons employed in the civil service under the Crimes Act. 

•	THAT all of the accused in this matter have been charged in their capacity as members of Cabinet under section 91 of the Constitution.

•	THAT Neil Prakash Sharma has been charged in his official capacity as the Minister of Health in 2011. 

•	THAT Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama and Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum have been charged as the Minister and Acting Minister of Finance respectively in 2011.

•	THAT all of the accused have been charged for offences of Abuse of Office and Breach of Trust by Person employed in the Public Service and an element of the offence which the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt is that the accused were employed in the civil service. 

•	THAT the Constitutional interpretation and application of section 163 of the Constitution to the Crimes Act for the definition of civil service falls under the jurisdiction of the High Court. 

•	THAT the State does not wish to waste the Magistrates Court time and resources by allowing the trial to proceed at the end of July 2025 and the Constitutional interpretation under section 163 of the Constitution is raised as a defence by the accused. This will cause a dilemma to the court and to the prosecution. 

•	THAT to ensure judicial expediency and fairness to the accused, the appropriate court to hear this matter is the High Court in interpreting section 163 of the Constitution. 

•	THAT the Magistrates Court does not have any jurisdiction to determine issues related to the interpretation of the Constitution.

•	THAT Justice Goundar in Criminal Case No. 215 of 2024 against Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama and Sitiveni Qiliho on May 9, 2025 set aside the transfer order by Magistrate Somaratne where the state and defence counsels had consented to transfer the constitutional determination of section 163 of the Constitution alone to the High Court prior to trial. 

•	THAT as a result of the ruling on May 9, 2025, the State is instituting proper transfer applications under section 188 and section 191 of the Criminal Procedure Act to allow the High Court to determine the interpretation of section 163 of the Constitution during the trial. 

•	THAT this case involves former Ministers of Government as such they are cases of high public interest therefore the High Court would be the most appropriate court.

•	THAT this application has been made prior to any evidence being led as the trial is scheduled to begin in late July, 2025 therefore there is no prejudice to the Accused persons.

•	THAT this application has been made because of the dispute to the definition of civil service under section 163 of the Constitution and the defence raised by defence counsels for the second and third accused persons in similar matters. It is their defence, section 163 overrides the definition of persons employed in the public service under the Crimes Act and therefore exempts their client from the definition under the Crimes Act and he should not have been charged for Abuse of Office. 

•	THAT the dispute as to the interpretation of section 163 of the Constitution affects an element of the offence as such in fairness to the accused, the trial must be heard in the High Court.

•	THAT this application should be granted for the reasons stated above and a new trial date be scheduled by the High Court. 

Affidavit in Opposition by the First Respondent 

[7]	The affidavit in opposition of the first respondent, Mr. Sharma is reproduced as follows:

•	I am the first accused person/first-named respondent in this matter. 

•	Unless stated otherwise or the context suggests otherwise, I state as follows:

a.	The facts deposed herein are true to the best of my belief and are within my knowledge, save for where I state to the contrary or the context suggests otherwise;
b.	The matters rendered on advice are based on the advice of my solicitors and any legal issues that arise from this application shall be dealt with by my counsel during the hearing; and 
c.	In identifying the sources of my information, I am not to be taken to be waiving any legal privilege to which I am entitled to. 

•	I have read and understand the Affidavit in Support of this application deposed by Ms. Tikoisuva filed on 13 May 2025 (“Affidavit in Support”). 

•	On 7 February 2024, I was charged and produced in the Magistrate’s Court in Suva with 2 separate counts of Abuse of Office and 2 separate counts of Breach of Trust by Person Employed in the Public Service. 

•	I have been charged with Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama and Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum. 

•	This matter is currently pending a pre-trial conference and trial dates have been fixed for August 2025.

•	I do not intend to respond to all of the matters in the affidavit in support but in so doing, I do not admit to any matter to which I do not respond. All the assertions are to be treated as denied unless I expressly admit to it. 

•	I note that the majority of the affidavit in support contains matters relating to the law and I state that my solicitors will address these issues in legal submissions at the hearing of this application. 

•	I disagree with the contents of paragraph 6. I do not agree to this matter being transferred to the High Court for trial and determination. 

•	I disagree with the contents of paragraph 8 of the affidavit in support and state that I have been charged in my (then) capacity of Minister of Health of the Republic of Fiji and not in the capacity of a member of cabinet. This is stated at paragraph 9 of the affidavit in support. 

•	I have elected to be tried in the Magistrates’ Court for the charges that I am facing in this matter and believe that the Magistrates’ Court will be able to determine this matter. 

•	The trial for this matter has been fixed for the month of August 2025 and I am very anxious to get this case over and done with. 

I am 70 years of age and this case has taken a great toll on my physical and mental wellbeing; the case is a source of great anxiety and stress for me. I am unable to rest properly and it has caused me to lose a great many of my patients such that it caused me to close my medical practice in October 2024 and find alternative employment so that I could earn an income. 

•	If there is a transfer of this matter to the High Court, I believe that the hearing of this case will be delayed as there is no guarantee that the High Court will be able to accommodate the same dates for trial or will be available at all this year for trial. As I understand it, the High Court has its own schedule and caseload. 

•	Furthermore, I have spent a considerable amount of time, effort and funds in preparation and anticipation of trial proceedings in August 2025. I cannot afford to start again in the High Court. 

•	I believe that if the application for transferring this matter to the High Court were granted, then I will be severely prejudiced owing to the above. 

•	Given the above, I seek that the application for transfer be dismissed with costs. 

Affidavit in Opposition by the Second and Third Respondents 

[8]	The affidavit in opposition of the second respondent, Mr. Bainimarama also on behalf of the third respondent, Mr. Sayed-Khaiyum is reproduced as follows:

•	I am the second named respondent in this action. I depose this affidavit in opposition to the affidavit in support deposed by Ms. Tikoisuva the Acting DPP [ODPP Affidavit] in support of the State’s notice of motion [Motion] filed on 14 May 2025 seeking: 

•	An order that the High Court has original jurisdiction to hear and determine any question relating to the interpretation or application of section 163 of the Constitution and therefore this matter is transferred to the High Court for trial. 

•	Such other orders that this court deems appropriate.

•	I am also authorized to depose this affidavit on behalf of the third named respondent who is also opposing the motion filed by the State. 

•	In so far as the contents of this affidavit are within my own personal knowledge, they are true, and in so far as they are not within my knowledge, I have identified the source of that information and they are true to the best of my information, knowledge and belief. 

•	I have been no personal knowledge about the matters contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 and the ODPP affidavit. 

•	I admit paragraphs 4 and 5.

•	As to paragraph 6: 

a.	Our Legal Counsel have raised an issue under section 163 of the Constitution which states that the definition of a person employed in the public service does not include in an office created by or continued in existence under the Constitution. 

b.	This is an issue of law because it is not disputed by the State that the third named respondent and I are indeed charged in our capacities as constitutional officeholders. 

c.	I am advised by our Legal Counsel is that if a person is deemed not to be employed in the public service, then the charge is a nullity and it was rogue conduct to file the charge to begin with.

d.	Since this was a legal question, we first raised it as a pre-trial issue under section 290 of the Criminal Procedure Act as this allows the Court to deal with all pre-trial applications.

e.	We wanted the Magistrates Court to determine this issue since it would save both side’s time and resources on how to move forward. 

f.	Our Legal Counsel has advised us the Section 100(7) of the Constitution allows the Magistrates Court to interpret a constitutional provision. 

g.	We still maintain this position. 

h.	It is not necessary to transfer the case to the High Court if the Magistrates Court can still deal with the issue as a pre-trial issue. 

i.	I verily believe that the DPP ought to have considered section 163 of the Constitution before filing the charges. 

•	As to paragraph 7:

a.	I am charged with one count of Abuse of Office in count 5 of the charge, one that is an indictable offence and can be tried summarily. 
The third accused is also charged with one count of Abuse of Office in Count 6 and one count of Obstructing the Course of Justice in Count 7 which is a summary offence.
 
b.	The State chose to file the charge in the Magistrates Court. 

c.	We elect Magistrates Court as our trial court.   

d.	The State will have to prove that the third accused and I were persons employed in the public/civil service in order for the State to provide the allegation of Abuse of Office. 

e.	This is not an evidentiary matter to be determined at trial but a legal issue that can be determined by looking at the relevant provisions of the Constitution. 

f.	The State admits that we are constitutional officeholders. Therefore, the State concedes to the fact that the definition of public service under the Constitution applies to us. 

g.	I am advised by our Legal Counsel that the Resident Magistrate has a discretion whether or not transfer a case to the High Court. 

h.	I note that Ms. Tikoisuva has not stipulated what is so complex or difficult about the charge faced by us. 

•	As to paragraph 8, I disagree that we are charged in our capacities as members of the cabinet. We are charged as Minister and Acting Minister respectively, who are appointed as constitutional officeholders under the Constitution.  Ms. Tikoisuva also accepts this at paragraph 10 of the ODPP affidavit. 

•	I admit paragraphs 9 and 10. 

•	As to paragraph 11, we have not been charged for Breach of Trust by Person employed in the Public Service. Only the first accused is charged with two counts of this offence. As far as the application of the term public service is concerned, the third accused and I are charged with one count each of Abuse of Office as per the charge. 

•	I deny with paragraph 12. I am advised by our Legal Counsel that neither the constitutional nor any provision under the Crimes Act fall under the jurisdiction of the High Court. Under section 100(7) of the Constitution the Magistrates Court can interpret the Constitution and any other law and can be resolved as a pre-trial issue as it does not require evidence but a reading of the law. 

•	As to paragraph 13:

a.	Trial is not scheduled to begin at the end of July 2025. 

b.	The State is incorrect to be holding the view that transfer for an interpretational matter will be saving the court’s time and resources. 

c.	The State admits that I am a constitutional officeholder but wants to transfer and proceed with trial in the High Court.

d.	We are advised by our Legal Counsel that this can be raised as a pre-trial issue in the Magistrates Court. 

e.	We were informed by our Legal Counsel that the Magistrates Court can deal with an issue relating to the interpretation of the Constitution pursuant to section 100(7) of the Constitution. 

f.	There will be no dilemma caused to the court or to Prosecution if this court provides the interpretation that it is empowered by the Constitution to provide. 

•	I do not admit paragraph 14 because the State has grounded this motion on the basis that the Magistrates Court cannot interpret the Constitution and only the High Court has the jurisdiction to do so. I am advised by our Legal Counsel that this is not true as the interpretation has arisen in the course of the proceedings and section 100(7) of the Constitution empowers the Magistrates Court to decide the matter. 

•	I deny paragraph 15. We are advised by our Legal Counsel that the Magistrates Court does not have jurisdiction to determine issues of constitutional interpretation under Section 100(7) of the Constitution.

•	As to paragraph 16:  

a.	Resident Magistrate Somaratne did not order any transfer;

b.	He sent the Constitutional issue to be resolved by the High Court; 

c.	We consented to this issue being resolved by the High Court;

d.	Judge Goundar declined the application because he said the transfer by RM Somaratne was procedurally incorrect. 

•	As to paragraph 17, I do not admit or share Ms. Tikoisuva’s legal opinion. I am aware that Justice Rajasinghe has already held that under Section 100(7), the Magistrates Court has the powers to interpret the Constitution. 

•	As to paragraph 18, I disagree because this is not the test on which a transfer is made. 

•	I disagree with paragraph 19. Trial is not scheduled to begin in late July 2025.

•	I deny paragraph 20. I am advised by our Legal Counsel that the State has made this application because it has misinterpreted the powers of the Magistrates Court and has taken the view that only the High Court can provide an interpretation of the term public service. This evident from paragraph 15 of the ODPP affidavit.

•	I disagree with paragraph 21 that in fairness to the accused persons, trial must be heard in the High Court. We are informed by our Legal Counsel that the Magistrates Court is a court of competent jurisdiction and which is empowered to provide an interpretation of constitutional provisions under Section 100(7) of the Constitution. It is in fact unfair to us as accused persons to be tried in the High Court when we have elected the Magistrates Court for trial. It is also unfair to us as accused persons to be tried in the High Court because the ODPP thinks that this is a case of high public interest.

•	I further ask that the interpretation of public/civil service be dealt with as a pre-trial issue, as I am advised by our Legal Counsel that it is not one that relates to evidence but rather the interpretation of law. 

•	There is a motion before the court where our Legal Counsel has asked this court to consider whether the Abuse of Office counts against me and the third accused can be sustained given that we are not employed in the public service. This is not an evidentiary matter that requires evidence during trial. 

•	I am advised by our Legal Counsel that this interpretation will benefit the court, both the Prosecution and Defence and also provide clarity for evidence at trial if it proceeds there. The interpretation of public service is a legal issue that can be determined by looking at the relevant provisions of the law. It must be noted that the State admits that we are constitutional officeholders in the ODPP affidavit. Therefore, the State concedes to the fact that the definition of public service under the Constitution applies to us. 

•	At to paragraph 22, I ask that the State’s motion for transfer to the High Court for trial be declined. 

Analysis and Determination 

[9]	I have considered the verbal and written submissions of the State and the respective Defence Counsel for the respondents, the affidavit in support submitted by the State and the affidavits in opposition submitted by the respective Defence Counsel for the respondents.

[10]	Prior to this application by the State and by way of notice of motion and affidavit dated 3rd September 2024, Defence Counsel for the second and third respondents had filed for several declarations and orders to be granted by this court predominantly on the alleged breach of the constitutional rights of the second and third respondents.  That particular application is pending before this court.  Similar applications was also made within the same week in the other two Magistrates’ Courts in which the second and third respondents were facing charges of a similar nature.   For the application before my brother Resident Magistrate Mr. Prasad, he had ruled on the issue of alleged constitutional breach of the constitutional rights of the second and third respondents.  Unsatisfied with the ruling, the Defence Counsel had appealed the matter to the High Court.   The appeal was successful to some extent.  Justice Rajasinghe stated in the case authority of Saneem and Sayed-Khaiyum v State Criminal Appeal Case No. HAA 01 of 2025 that for the issue of the alleged breach of the constitutional rights of the second and third respondents, the matter is to be referred to the High Court pursuant to section 44(5) of the Constitution as long as it was not frivolous or vexatious.  His Lordship stated as follows in the matter that: 

“32.	The Magistrate’s Court has been granted jurisdiction to determine questions regarding the interpretation of the Constitution if such issues arise during any proceedings before it.  So as to understand the scope and boundaries of the interpretative jurisdiction conferred upon to the Magistrates’ Court, it is prudent to comprehend the jurisdiction of the High Court as outlined under section 100 (4) of the Constitution, which states: 

“The High Court also has original jurisdiction in any matter arising under this Constitution or involving the interpretation.”

33.	Section 100 of the Constitution defines the High Court and its jurisdiction.  In doing so, section 100(4) grants the High Court original jurisdiction over two constitutional matters, i.e., any issue arising under the Constitution and the interpretation of the Constitution.  Original jurisdiction refers to a Court’s power to hear and decide an issue for the first time.

34.	Conversely, section 100(7) does not confer original jurisdiction for interpretation but rather a limited interpretative jurisdiction if such a question arises during any proceedings before the Magistrate’s Court.  Hence, the interpretative jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court under section 100(7) of the Constitution is restricted to the issues of interpretation that arise in the proceedings.  Moreover, section 100(7) does not grant the Magistrate’s Court the jurisdiction to address any other issues arising under the Constitution.”

[11]	Thereafter, for the similar application before my brother Resident Magistrate, Mr. Somaratne, he had relied on section 44(5) of the Constitution and referred the matter to the High Court.  The referral was dismissed.  Justice Goundar stated in the case authority of State v Bainimarama and Qiliho Criminal Misc. No. Ham 055 of 2025 that no transfer can be made on the sole purpose of a legal opinion being sought on an element of the alleged offence.  His Lordship highlighted the case authority of Singh v DPP [2003] FJHC 221; HAM0043D.2003S (18 November 2003) and stated that “such premature applications disrupt the integrity of criminal trials and may undermine judicial economy.”  His Lordship further stated as follows in the matter that:

“[12]	Section 191 of the CPA allows a Magistrate to transfer any charges or proceedings to the High Court.  However, this must be interpreted within the broader framework of the CPA.

[13]	Section 188 of the CPA governs the transfer of summary cases to the High Court.  It allows a Magistrate to transfer a case for trial if it appears that the case ought to be tried in the High Court.  An application may also be made by the prosecutor before trial to request such transfer.

[14]	In State v Singh, Crim Case No. 329 of 2016 (31 July 2017), Rajasinghe J held that while section 191 confers transfer powers, such discretion must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the CPA.

[15]	The Supreme Court in Tasova v DPP [2022] FJSC 43; CAV0012.2019 (26 September 2022), held that section 188 gives Magistrates unfettered discretion to transfer any case to the High Court, but only for trial purposes, regardless of whether the offence is indictable, summary, otherwise unassigned.

[16]	In the present case, the transfer was not for trial, but for an opinion on a legal issue concerning elements of the offences.  There is no statutory basis for such a referral.” 

[12]	In the Supreme Court case authority of Tasova v State CAV 0012 of 2019, the revisionary panel of judges stated that:

“35.	It is more appropriate for Magistrates to transfer proceedings to High Court where the accused is charged with indictable offence (over which High Court has exclusive jurisdiction), and summary offence arising out of same facts for the simple reason that common sense and public interest dictates that the offences arising out of same facts ought to tried once before one Judicial Officer.  This will surely ensure that victims of crimes are not put to undue inconvenience and that there is no inconsistency in finding of facts and application of legal principles in addition to the delay that will ensue if two judicial officers will be involved in dealing with charges arising out of same facts.”

[13]	It was further stated that:

		“39.	In summary this Court holds that:-

(a)	Indictable Offence:  Proceedings are instituted in the Magistrates Court and then transferred to the High Court which has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to ss4(1)(a) and 35(2) of CPA.

(b)	Indictable Offence Triable Summarily:  The accused has right to elect to be tried in the Magistrates Court or the High Court pursuant to ss4(1)(b) and 35(2) of the CPA.

If the accused elects trial by Magistrate and if it appears to the Magistrates that proceedings ought to be transferred to High Court or application is made by prosecutor for transfer of case to High Court then the Magistrate may in the exercise of his or her discretion transfer the proceedings to the High Court.

(c)	Summary Offence:  The Magistrate Court has jurisdiction to hear cases.  However if it appears to the Magistrate that proceedings ought to be transferred to High Court or application is made by the prosecutor for transfer of case to High Court then the Magistrate may in the exercise of his or her discretion transfer the proceedings to the High Court.
(d)	Offence for which no Court is prescribed (s5(2) of CPA:  The Magistrate has jurisdiction to hear cases.  However if it appears to the Magistrate that proceedings ought to be transferred to High Court or application is made by prosecutor for transfer of case to High Court then the Magistrate may in exercise of his or her discretion transfer the proceedings in the High Court.

40.	Once, the Magistrate transfers the charges or proceedings to the High Court pursuant to s.188 and 191 of CPA, then the High Court in exercise of its unlimited Jurisdiction pursuant to s.100(3) of the Constitution shall hear and determine the matter.” 

[14]	The State is making an application to seek transfer of this matter to the High Court for the purpose of trial because of the inconsistent definition of the term “public service” as provided for under section 163(c) of the Constitution and the term “persons employed in the civil service” under section 4 of the Crimes Act.  The State submits that as all the respondents are facing the charge of Abuse of Office, the definition of the term “public service” as provided for under section 163(c) of the Constitution can be utilized as a valid defence by the respective Defence Counsel.  The State also submits that the definition of the term “public service” as provided for under section 163(c) of the Constitution can be utilized as an immunity ground by the respective Defence Council.  

[15]	As it is, all these matters pertaining in particular to the second and third respondents has been making its way back and forth from the High Court by way of review or appeal for miscellaneous applications arising from their matters in three separate magistrates courts.  It is not based on pre-trial issues as per the ruling of Justice Rajasinghe in the case authority of Saneem and Sayed-Khaiyum v State Criminal Appeal Case No. HAA 01 but more so on constitutional issues.  His Lordship also stated that the section 275 of the Criminal Procedure Act is not applicable so as to send the matter to the High Court on a Case Stated basis.  His Lordship further stated that the civil jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked on a revisionary stance to review the correct, legality and motives behind the decision of the former Acting Director of Public Prosecutions pursuant to section 117(8) of the Constitution.  Considering the numerous preliminary issues arising in this matter, it is highly likely that further delays will be anticipated.

[16]	It is this Court’s considered view that it will be beyond the scope and jurisdiction in its limited capacity to give interpretation pertaining to constitutional issues and in particular to the inconsistencies in the definition of the term “public service” as provided for under section 163(c) of the Constitution and the term “persons employed in the civil service” under section 4 of the Crimes Act.  This Court’s interpretation pertaining to constitutional issues in its limited capacity will only be of a persuasive nature and will not be binding on any other courts.  This Court does not hold the scope and jurisdiction to declare or make an order that section 4 of the Crimes Act that defines the term “persons employed in the civil service” be deemed invalid as it is not consistent with section 163(c) of the Constitution that defines the term “public service” differently.  

[17]	The respondents are all former High Office holders and it will serve them best to have the High Court address the constitutional issues arising in this matter once and for all.  The High Court in its original and unlimited jurisdiction is the proper forum to deal with the constitutional issues arising in this matter.  The lack of local jurisprudence in this area further warrants for this matter to be transferred to the High Court.

[18]	It is this Court’s considered view that this matter be transferred in its entirety to the High Court for the purpose of trial in fairness to the respondents who have raised several constitutional issues.  Accordingly, the State’s application for transfer of this matter to the High Court for the purpose of trial is hereby granted.  The hearing dates for this matter from 4th August 2025 to 8th August 2025, 18th August 2025 to 22nd August 2025 and 25th August 2025 to 29th August 2025 is hereby vacated.  This matter is to be called in the High Court on 26th June 2025.

[19]	28 days to appeal.

On this 12th day of June 2025.

…………………………..
Sufia Hamza
Senior Resident Magistrate