IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI AT LAUTOKA
APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. HBC 251 OF 2019.

[On Appeal from the Decision  dated 28th July 2023  pronounced by the Master of the High Court of Fiji at Lautoka in Civil Action HBC No: 251 of 2019]

BETWEEN 	:	
ARIA INVESTMENTS PTE LIMITED a Limited Liability Company, having its registered office at Unit C4, Port Denarau Retail Centre, Denarau Island, Fiji.
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF

A N D	:	
OFFICIAL RECEIVER on behalf of DENARAU WATERS PTE LIMITED (formerly known as Gulf Investments (Fiji) Pty Limited) a limited liability company having its registered office at Unit 01 2A, Commercial Complex, Port Denarau, Nadi, Fiji.
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT

BEFORE		: 	Hon. A.M. Mohamed Mackie - J.
COUNSEL        	 	 :	Mr. A. Narayan -Junior -for the Appellant/Plaintiff Company.
		 	:	Mr. S. Kanth -for the Official Receiver representing 
                                                     the substituted Respondent/Defendant Company.
HEARING		 :	On 14th March 2024.
W. SUBMISSIONS         :           filed by the Appellant on 18th October 2024.
			 :           No written submissions filed on behalf of the Respondent.
JUDGMENT		 :	Delivered on 20th  January 2025. 

JUDGMENT.

A.	INTRODUCTION:

1.	This is an Appeal arising out of the decision dated 28th July 2023 pronounced by the learned former Master (“the Master”) of this Court, pursuant to the hearing held before him on 3rd November 2020 for the assessment of special and general damages, as directed by Hon. Jude Nanayakkara -j (as he then was) in terms of paragraph 3 of the Orders made in his judgment dated 24th January 2024 pronouced in favor of the plaintiff-appellant (“the appellant”).

B.	BACKGROUND FACTS:

2.	In order to give the clear background facts, I can do no better than reproducing paragraphs 01 and 02 of the impugned decision of the Master, dated 28th July 2023, which give the details as to what initially  led the plaintiff-appellant to the Court seeking the substantial and injunctive reliefs against the defendant- respondent.

01.	“The plaintiff and Denarau Waters Pte Limited (hereinafter called as the original defendant) on 26th May 2016 entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement by which the original defendant agreed to develop and the plaintiff agreed to purchase a residential lot within the development. The proposed Lot was later registered as State Lease No. 21409 being Lot 29 on land known as “Denarau Island” (part of) situated in the District of Nadi, Province of Ba, and having an area of 1011m2. The agreed consideration was $ 799,000 plus Value Added Tax. The plaintiff on the same day provided a Bank Guarantee in the sum of $ 79,900 being the 10% deposit of purchase price through the Bank of South Pacific.

02.	The original defendant on or about 31.03.2018 informed the plaintiff that, it had provided all services and the parties could complete the transaction. However, the plaintiff upon inspection found that, there was no proper access to the development and the designated Lot and required the original defendant to provide the same. However, the original defendant allegedly breached the terms of the agreement and wanted to call on the Bank Guarantee. As a result of the alleged breach, the plaintiff terminated/rescinded the agreement on 29.08.2019 as pleaded in paragraph 12 of the Statement of Claim and sought the following reliefs from the court”. 

C.	CHORONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

3.	The appellant on 3rd October 2019, filed action against the respondent DENARAU WATERS PTE LIMITED (formerly known as Gulf Investments (Fiji) Pty) by way of its   Writ of Summons & the Statement of Claim (SOC) seeking the following reliefs:

1.	“A declaration that the Defendant’s call on the Bank Guarantee was unlawful and in breach of the agreement dated 26th May 2016;

2.	An injunction restraining the Defendant by itself and/or through their servants, agents, authorized officers, directors, partners or otherwise and howsoever from dealing with, withdrawing, collecting, assigning, utilizing, dissipating and/or calling on the Bank Guarantee provided by the Bank of South Pacific on behalf of the Plaintiff under the agreement dated 26th May 2016 until the final determination of this action or further order of this Honorable Court.

3.	Special damages in a sum of $ 1,117.25 [One Thousand One Hundred Seventeen Dollars AND TWENT FIVE CENTS];

4.	General Damages;

5.	Interest at the rate of 13.5% per annum on the sum of $1,117.25 and other damages  until satisfaction  of the amount  in full  under the Law Reform (miscellaneous Provisions) (Death and Interest) Act;

6.	Aggravated and/or exemplary damages for breach of contract;

7.	Costs of the action on a full Solicitor / client indemnity basis; and 

8.	Such further or other relief as the Honorable court deems fit, just and expedient.” 

4.	The appellant had also, simultaneously, filed an Ex-Parte Summons supported by the affidavit sworn by Mr. Ashnil Kumar Narayan, being a director of the appellant company, and accordingly obtained an interim injunction Order in terms of paragraph 1 of the Ex-Parte Summons, which relief was also prayed for in paragraph 2 of the prayers to the SOC.

5.	As there was neither appearance by or on behalf of the respondent nor an acknowledgment of service and/ or the Statement of Defence (SOD) was filed, despite the Writ of summons and the SOC, together with the injunction Orders, were reportedly served on the respondent, the Court on 11th October 2019 made the interim injunction order as a final order pending the determination of the writ action. 

6.	Subsequently, the appellant on 6th November 2019 filed an Ex-Parte summons pursuant to order 19 Rule 7 of the High Court Rules 1988 and inherent jurisdiction of the Court, seeking the same reliefs prayed for in the SOC. Accordingly, Hon. Jude Nanayakkara (as he then was), having heard the same on 6th November 2019, delivered his judgment dated 24th January 2020 to the following effect;

1.	A declaration that the Defendant’s call on the Bank Guarantee was unlawful and in breach of the agreement dated 26th May 2016, is granted.

2.	An injunction restraining the Defendant by itself and/or through their servants, agents, authorized officers, directors, partners or otherwise and howsoever from dealing with, withdrawing, collecting, assigning, utilizing, dissipating and/or calling on the Bank Guarantee provided by the Bank of South Pacific on behalf of the Plaintiff under the agreement dated 26th May 2016 is granted;

3.	General and special damages to be assessed by the Master. (emphasis mine)

4.	The Defendant to pay costs of $2,000.00 (summarily assessed) to the Plaintiff within seven days from the date of this judgment.

7.	Accordingly, the hearing for the assessment of General and Special damages, as per the judgment of Hon. Jude Nanayakkara -J, was held before the Master on 3rd November 2020, wherein 2 witnesses, namely, Mr. Radikesh Prasad (the Valuer) and Ms. Priyashna Narayan (the accountant of the appellant Company) gave evidence on behalf of the appellant by marking 15 documents.

8.	Prior to the decision on the above hearing, the respondent company being wound up through a separate proceeding, the appellant on 2nd March 2022 filed a Summons seeking, inter-alia, the leave to continue the proceedings against the respondent in liquidation and to substitute the Official Receiver in place of the respondent, and the court on 23rd August 2022 allowed the said application and granted orders in terms of the Summons. Thus, the Official Receiver became substituted in place of the respondent Company.

9.	Subsequently, the Master, who heard the witnesses for the appellant at the assessment of damages hearing, by his decision dated 28th July 2023 made the following Orders.;

a)	The Plaintiff is not entitled for any damages in this matter.

b)	The injunction granted by judge is dissolved as the matter is now concluded, and

c)	The Plaintiff to bear all costs.

10.	Being aggrieved by the above decision of the Master, the appellant on 08th August 2023 filed its Notice of Appeal, together with the following grounds of appeal.

D.	GROUNDS OF APPEAL:

1.	The Master erred in Law and in fact by holding “[n]ot a single word was uttered by the witness, especially, the second witness, about … the bank guarantee” and that “the plaintiff would have used the said permanent injunction and recovered the said amount from the original defendant” and went on to dissolve the injunction granted on 24th January 2020 by the Honorable Justice Jude Nanayakkara (as he then was) when;

i.	The hearing before the Learned Master did not call for, nor was it an issue, to determine what transpired with the bank guarantee;

ii.	 He misconstrued the purpose of a bank guarantee and why the injunction was still relevant and necessary;

iii.	There was no application before the Court calling for the dissolution/discharge of the final injunction granted by the judge of the High court; and/or

iv.	The Learned Master had no power and/or jurisdiction to interfere with the injunction granted by the judge of the High Court on 24th January,2020 pursuant to Order 59 Rule 2(a) (i) of the High court Rules 1988.

2.	The learned Master erred in Law and in fact by formulating a “pertinent question” for determination, that being, “whether the Plaintiff is entitled to claim such amount ($364,000.00) in this case after rescinding / terminating the agreement with the original defendant and obtaining an injunction as aforesaid without even paying the purchase price at all” and went on to dismiss the claim and assessment of damages when;

i.	The Honorable Court was functus on issues dealing with liability;

ii.	The learned Master exceeded his jurisdiction in dealing with the liability issues contrary to Order 59 Rule 2(d); and 

iii.	There was an Order made by the Honorable judge of the High court on 24th January, 2020 requiring the Learned Master to assess the damages.

3.	The Learned Master misconstrued the application before him, the evidence presented and gave consideration to authorities that were irrelevant to the claim made by the plaintiff (such as relying on the case of Newbigging v Adma (1886) 34 Ch. D. 582 when the case was in reference to reliefs for misrepresentation) and thereby went on to dismiss the claim and assessment of damages when;

i.	There was an order made by the Honorable Judge of the high Court holding that the Defendant had breached the agreement dated 26th May, 2016 entered into between the parties;

ii.	The Plaintiff’s claim for general damages was based on a “loss of a chance to make a gain from the contemplated purchase”; and 

iii.	The evidence to support the claim for a loss of a chance to make a gain from the contemplated purchase was uncontroverted. (All the above emphasis are mine)

E.	HEARING OF THE APPEAL

11.	Necessary formalities being duly complied with, when the appeal came up for hearing before me on 14th March 2024, only the learned Counsel for the appellant made oral submissions. No submission whatsoever was made by the State Counsel, though he was present at the hearing and representing the Official Receiver.

12.	Written submission was also filed by the appellant on 18th October 2024, but not by the respondent. Though, the hearing had taken place in March 2024, the judgment could not be delivered in timely manner as I had to be away from Fiji owing to my sudden medical evacuation in June 2024. I thank the Counsel for the appellant for the useful submissions filed along with decided authorities, and both the counsel for bearing  the delay in pronouncing this judgment.

F.	ANALYSIS:

Ground-01.

13.	As per the relief No- 3 granted in terms of the Judgment dated 24th January 2020 and pronounced by Hon. Jude Nanayakkara- J, the only task before the Master was to assess the general and special damages and not to go into the propriety of the substantial judgment or injunction order made by the High Court Judge.
 
14.	Further, the injunctive relief that had been granted by the High Court judge, in terms of his judgment dated 24th January 2020,  was a substantial and final relief granted to the appellant , which was effectively  preventing and restraining the respondent  by itself and/or through their servants , agents , authorized officers , directors, partners  or otherwise  and howsoever  from dealing with ,  withdrawing, collecting , assigning , utilizing , dissipating and /or  calling the Bank Guarantee  provided by the Bank of south pacific  on behalf of the appellant  under the agreement dated 26th May 2016.

15.	The consequences of vacating the permanent injunction that had been granted in favor of the appellant, as a final and substantial relief, seem to have had escaped the attention of the Master, when he decided to dissolve the same by his impugned decision dated 28th July 2023.

16.	Master has failed to consider that in the absence of the permanent injunction order so granted by the Judge as a final relief, the appellant’s Bank Guarantee will be at the risk of being dealt with, withdrawn, collected, assigned, utilized, dissipated and /or   called by the respondent, leaving the appellant to lose the benefit of the substantial relief so obtained to protect its Bank Guarantee.  

17.	Moreover, in terms of Order 59 Rule 2(a) (1) of the High Court Rules 1988, clearly the Master had no jurisdiction to deal with the injunction that had already been granted by a Judge of the High Court. With all due respect, I observe that the Master seems to have inadvertently, exercised the appellate jurisdiction with regard to the final relief granted by the Judge of the High Court, which can only be done by the Court of Appeal.

18.	In view of the above, if this part of the Master’s impugned decision is allowed to stand, a serious prejudice would be caused to the appellant, as the Master has exceeded his jurisdiction by dissolving the permanent injunction granted, particularly in the absence of any application before him and notwithstanding the fact that he had no jurisdiction.

19.	Accordingly, I stand fully convinced that this ground of appeal should succeed, the appeal in this regard should be allowed   and the permanent injunction granted on 24th January 2020 by the Judge of the High Court should be reinstated and it should remain intact. 

Ground-02.

20.	This ground also deals with the jurisdiction and the power of the Master. The final judgment being pronounced by the Judge on 24th January 2020 granting the declaratory and injunctive reliefs as per paragraphs 1 and  2 of the of the orders made,  the judge also ordered, as per paragraph 3 thereof, for the General and Special damages to be  assessed by the Master. 

21.	Thus, when the issue of liability stood determined by the judge, what remained to be done was the assessment of the Special and General damages that is payable to the appellant by the respondent as per the judgment.

22.	The finding of liability by a judge cannot be interfered with by the Master, unless it is done so by a higher forum after following the due appeal procedures. The Master has no role to play, except for determining the quantum of damages by hearing the witnesses in that regard.

23.	When the judge of the High Court had found that the respondent had breached the agreement is liable to pay damages on account of it and ordered the damages to be assessed by the Master, the duty of the Master was confined only to go into the hearing and assess the damages that is payable as he was bound to comply with the orders of the judge.

24.	Order 59 rule 2 (d) provides;

“The master shall have and exercise all the power, authority and jurisdiction which may be exercised by a judge in relation to the following causes and matters;

(d) assessment of damages where liability has been determined” 

25.	In view of the above Rule, it is clear that the Master does not have power to deal with issue of liability. Therefore, when the Master formulated a “pertinent question” that being “whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim such an amount ($364,000) in this case after rescinding / terminating the agreement…”  what he had ended up doing was the revisiting the issue of liability.

26.	Once the issue of liability had already been dealt with and finally decided by a Judge of the High Court, not only the Master, but even a judge of the same Court cannot meddle with it, unless by way of the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction in that regard. In this matter, what remained to be done was the assessment by the Master as provided by the aforesaid Rule and directed by the judgment dated 24th January 2020. Unfortunately, the Master in this matter has deviated from his duty of assessment of damages, and proceeded to pronounce that the appellant is not entitled for any damages, for which he had no jurisdiction.

27.	Counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to the decision in  Deo construction Development Company Ltd v Denarau Corporation Limited Civil Action No- HBC 184 of 2014, wherein the Master had committed the same error, when Justice Mohamed Ajmeer (as he then was) had decided on the issue of liability in favor of the Appellant, but the  Master, by exceeding his jurisdiction, had  refused to grant damages by relying on the purported ground that the damages had not been specifically pleaded. 

28.	Let me reproduce the relevant paragraph of my judgement in Appeal thereof, where in paragraph 28.6 of the judgment I had held;

“The averments in paragraph 13 of Vimal Deo’s supporting affidavit and the contents of the documents annexed thereto seem to have satisfied Ajmeer-J to award damages and to order for same to be assessed as the Plaintiff had pleaded. When the learned Judge has arrived at a finding that the Plaintiff is entitle for damages to be assessed, I don’t think it is permissible for the learned Master, who was assigned with the task of assessing the damages in terms of the judgment, to re-visit the judgment and the pleadings on which it stands and to probe into the propriety or adequacy of it. (Emphasis added)

29.	For the reasons discussed above, I find that the ground of appeal No-02 is also with merits and the Master’s decision that the appellant is not entitled for any damages cannot stand, it has to be set aside and the judgment dated 24th January 2020 should remain intact on the question of liability on the part of the respondent.

Ground -03.

30.	The substantial reliefs claimed by the appellant, as per the prayers to the SOC, were; 

A.	A Declaration that the Respondent’s call on the Bank Guarantee was unlawful and breach of agreement dated 26th May 2016;
B.	An injunction restraining the Respondent from calling the Bank Guarantee;
C.	Special damages in a sum of $1,117.25.
D.	General damages.
   
31.	An Ex-parte temporary injunctive Order, as per prayer (B) above, being granted on 3rd October 2019, subsequently, on 11th October 2019, it was made final pending the determination of the substantive matter, as there was no response by the respondent notwithstanding the fact that the order was reportedly served of the respondent. However, after hearing the Summons for judgment under Order 19 Rule 7 of the High Court Rules, the Judge of the High Court , being satisfied of the breach of contract by the respondent, while granting the final relief of declaration as prayed for in paragraph (A) above, also ordered that both the special and general damages to be assessed by the Master. The High Court also made the injunction order that was in force a permanent one.

32.	I have already dealt with the ground of appeal in relation to the injunction, which was wrongfully dissolved by the Master by his impugned decision. I have also re-instated the same to be in force, which would safe-guard the appellant’s Bank Guarantee from being withdrawn, collected, assigned, utilized, dissipated and/ or called by the respondent forever.

33.	Fortunately, the Master has not dealt with the declaratory relief (A) above, that had been granted by the High court in favor of the appellant and it still remains intact. However, the substantial relief for damages granted to the appellant by the High Court Judge, has now been deprived by the Master’s impugned decision, and the appellant has to be contented only with the said declaratory relief, which is confined to the paper, with no any sort of tangible reliefs to compensate the loss of expected profit out of the intended sale. 

34.	When so depriving the appellant of such monetary reliefs, the Master has relied on the decision in Newbigging v Adma (1886) 34 Ch. D. 582, which was in relation to a case of misrepresentation and not for breach of contract). This seems to have had escaped the attention of the Master.

35.	In this regard, the Master seems to have failed to appreciate a number of facts, firstly, that the High Court had already found that the respondent had breached the agreement dated 26th May 2026, Secondly, the appellant’s claim for general damages was based on a “loss of an opportunity to make a gain from the intended purchase”, and, Thirdly, the evidence led to support the claim for a loss of an opportunity to make a gain, through the intended purchase, was uncontroverted. 

36.	As alluded to in the foregoing paragraphs, the Master’s role was confined only to do the assessment of damages, as directed by the High Court Judge, since he had found that the appellant was entitled for such damages on account of the profit that it would have made through the intended sale that would have taken place, if not for the breach of the agreement by the respondent.

37.	The Case Law authority in Chaplin v Hicks C.A 1911cited, and relied on by the Counsel for the appellant, demonstrates that   an affected party can seek damages for the loss of an opportunity to make a profit or gain. The appellant hereof had the legitimate expectation to make a gain and/or profit through the intended purchase and sale, which was prevented by the breach of the agreement by the respondent. 

38.	In Chaplin (supra), it was held that even where the damages cannot be assessed with any certainty, it does not relieve the wrong-doer of the liability of paying damages for his breach of contract.  The Court did not find any difficulty in assessing damages in the said case. In the case in hand too, the damages were not too remote. Parties were very well aware as to where they stood and what was to be the outcome in the event the agreement was duly complied with or on the other hand, it is observed in breach.  

39.	Obviously, the Master has exceeded his jurisdiction and gone into examine the question of entitlement of damages to the appellant, when the same had already been fully and finally decided by the Judge.  Accordingly, I find that the 3rd ground of appeal hereof too is with merits and the Master’s decision in relation to damages cannot stand as it is.

G.	THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES:

40.	Having exercised my appellate jurisdiction and found that the Master’s impugned decision in relation to the injunctive order and damages cannot stand, I shall now turn towards the task of the assessment of damages, which the Master failed to perform leading the appellant to this Court.

Special Damages:

41.	The Appellant had pleaded and claimed a sum of $1,117.25 as special damages being legal costs incurred for arranging finance for the intended purchase. This was rejected by the Master on the, purported, discrepancies in the relevant invoice. However, Counsel for the appellant, in his written submissions, has intimated that the appellant will not pursue the appeal in relation to this claim due to the inadequacy of evidence in that regard. Therefore, I shall desist from examining the correctness of Master’s decision on it.

General Damages:

42.	As per the Sale & Purchase agreement, the appellant had agreed to buy and the respondent had agreed to sell the subject property lot No-29 for a sum of $799,000.00 Fijian Dollars.  The witness No-1(the Valuer) namely, Mr. Radhikesh Prakash, has in his evidence confirmed that the value of the subject property was assessed as $1,163,000.00 in terms of his Valuation Report marked as “Pex-1”.

43.	The PW-2, Ms. Priyashna Narayan, the accountant of the appellant Company in her evidence   confirmed the intended purchase price as $799,000.00, and gave further evidence that the appellant Company was to sell the property once they would have acquired it with the transfer formalities being fulfilled. She also confirmed that once the land is developed, the value of it increases and she is aware that the property had been valued for a sum 1.163 million Fijian Dollars and the purchase and sale did not eventuate as the respondent breached the agreement by not providing the access road to the subject matter land lot 29.

44.	 It was also in her evidence that the subject property (lot 29) was one of the prime and best lots in the Island, and from the end of this lot the entire Island could be seen, and she knew that if they were to buy this lot, they will be selling it at a good price and they would have sold it   as per the valuation sum or more than that. She also confirmed that between the intended sale price and the purchase price there is a loss of $364,000.00 (Three Hundred and Sixty-Four Thousand Dollars) for the appellant Company being the expected profit.

45.	Further, it is to be observed that the Valuation Report marked as “Pex-1” had been obtained by none other than the respondent Company, way back in 2018, with the inspection being done on 11th May 2018.  and without the involvement or any influence of the appellant Company. 

46.	PW-2 has given clear and convincing evidence on similar dealings undertaken by the appellant Company with substantial profits, particularly with regard to a deal  in Fantasy Island, where the appellant had got a buyer when they had just  signed the agreement to purchase and  the development was  still on going. She also went to the extent of divulging the purchase and resale prices of it, which according to her was $310,000.00 and $1. 15 million, with VAT, respectively. 

47.	With the above undisputed evidence as to what type of lands the appellant generally deals with, how they conduct the sales and how much they earn as profits out of it, I find that it would not have been a difficult task for the appellant company to have had this subject matter land too easily disposed at the value disclosed by the Valuation Report marked as Pex-1 or at a higher price than that value. 

48.	 By his undisputed evidence, the  PW-1,  Valuer, has substantiated the contents of the Valuation Report and averred further that the valuation would be higher in the near future. I have no reason to disbelieve the evidence of both the above witnesses, who corroborated each other’s evidence.

49.	Further, I have no reason whatsoever to believe  that the intended Sale price of S1.15 million, as per the Valuation Report, was an exaggerated sum, and the appellant would not have made such a profit in a sum of $364,000.00 through the intended sale.

H.	CONCLUSION:

50.	On careful consideration of the totality of both the oral and documentary evidence adduced before the Master, the other contents of the record including  the submissions made before me, I stand convinced that all 3 grounds of appeal adduced by the appellant are with full of merits, the appeal should be allowed and the impugned decision of the Master has to be set aside, with costs in favor of the appellant.
 
51.	I don’t find any reason for this Court to refuse the grant of the damages as prayed for or to reduce it by any amount. Accordingly, on my considered assessment, I decide to grant general damages as prayed for in a sum of $364,000.00.

Interest:
52.	The Appellant, in its SOC and in the Ex-parte Summons for Judgment, had prayed for 13.5% interest on the damages. The High Court, by its judgment dated 24th January 2020, has not granted any interest to the appellant. Therefore, this Court, which only exercises its appellate jurisdiction over the Master’s decision dated 28th July 2023 and assess  damages, cannot grant any new relief that was not granted by the substantial judgment. Accordingly, claim for interest is declined.

Costs:

53.	The High Court by its Judgment dated 24th January 2020 has granted $2000.00 as summarily assessed costs and this order remains intact by the Master’s impugned decision.  I agree with the counsel for the appellant that the appellant had incurred costs in bringing two witnesses before the Master, on other connected matters before the Master and in connection with this appeal. The Appellant moves for $ 6000.00 as cost incurred before both forums. However, considering the circumstances, particularly, that the respondent had not appeared before any forum, I decide to grant only $1,00.00 (One Thousand Dollars) as summarily assessed costs payable by the respondent.

54.	However, since this Court has not dealt with Master’s refusal to assess the Special damages payable to the appellant, that part of the Master’s impugned decision will remain un-assailed. 
I.	FINAL ORDERS:

a.	The appeal is allowed.

b.	The Master’s decision dated 28th July 2023, except for his decision to refuse the assessment of special damages, is hereby set aside.

c.	The appellant is awarded general damages payable by the respondent in a sum of $364,000.00 (Three Hundred and Sixty-Four Thousand Fijian Dollars) as assessed by this Court.

d.	No interest is assessed and/ or awarded.

e.	In addition to the costs awarded by the High Court in a sum of $ 2000.00, by its judgment dated 24th January 2020, a further sum of $1000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) is summarily assessed and awarded to the appellant, being the Costs before the Master and this Court.

f.	A sealed copy of this judgment be served on the Official Receiver representing the Respondent. 

At High Court of Lautoka on this 20th  day of January 2025.

A.M. Mohamed Mackie
Judge.

SOLICITORS:
For the Appellant/Plaintiff: Messrs. A. K. Lawyers - Barristers & Solicitors.
For the Respondent/Defendant ( Official Receiver) :AG’s Office, Lautoka.