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Hussain v Co Opted Committee of the Association of the Fantasy Island Lesses [2025] FJHC 477; HBC184.2023 (31 July 2025)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
WESTERN DIVISION
AT LAUTOKA


[CIVIL JURISDICTION]


Civil Action No. HBC 184 of 2023


BETWEEN
KING ANWAR HUSSAIN of Lot 12, Drift Road, Level 3, Office 4.

PLAINTIFF



AND

CO OPTED COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
FANTASY ISLAND LESSES
.

1ST DEFENDANT

AND

ABBAS ALI, Managing Director of Juxta Beach Fiji PTE
Limited, Fantasy Island, Nadi, Businessman.

2ND DEFENDANT

AND

HOME FINANCE COMPANY PTE LTD TRADING AS HFC BANK

3RD DEFENDANT

BEFORE : Master P. Prasad

Counsels : Mr. K. Chand & Ms. S. Kumar for Plaintiff

Mr. A.K. Narayan (Snr) for 2nd Defendant

Date of Hearing : 1 April 2025.

Date of Decision : 31 July 2025

RULING

(Strike out)

  1. The Plaintiff had previously commenced Civil Action No. HBC 85 of 2022 against all the 3 named Defendants in this matter. There were Consent Orders made in that case based on Terms of Settlement reached between the parties therein.
  2. The Plaintiff subsequently filed other proceedings in the High Court being Civil Action No. 302 and 303 of 2022 against the 2nd Defendant and both these cases were struck out.
  3. The Plaintiff has commenced this action to set aside the Consent Orders made in HBC 85 0f 2022.
  4. The 2nd Defendant has filed a Summons to strike out the same pursuant to Order 18 Rule 18 of the High Court Rules 1988 and the inherent jurisdiction of this Court (Summons). The Summons is founded on the grounds that the Plaintiff’s claim:
    1. Does not disclose a cause of action against any of the Defendants.
    2. Is not properly constituted against any of the Defendants who are either non-existent entities or not property identified.
    1. Is embarrassing, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process.

The Summons also seeks an order for costs of the application to be paid by the Plaintiff and/or his solicitors personally on a solicitor/client full indemnity basis.


  1. The 2nd Defendant filed an Affidavit in Support and an Affidavit in Reply. The Plaintiff filed an Affidavit in Opposition.

Civil Action No. HBC 85 of 2022


  1. The determination of this Summons requires consideration of Civil Action No. 85 of 2022. The background of HBC 85 of 2022 is as follows:
    1. The Plaintiff was removed from his position as the chairperson of the 1st Defendant’s association. Consequently, the Plaintiff instituted HBC 85 of 2022 seeking inter alia, certain declarations, compensation and costs. The Plaintiff had obtained certain ex-parte orders against the Defendants.
    2. The 2nd Defendant then filed an application to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim and a few days prior to the hearing of the strike out application, the Plaintiff’s counsel wrote to the 2nd Defendant’s counsel notifying of the Plaintiff’s intention to amend the Writ of Summons (annexure “AA-4” of the 2nd Defendant’s Affidavit in Support)
    1. The 2nd Defendant’s counsel responded on 22 August 2022 opposing any adjournment of the strike out hearing, and informed the Plaintiff that they would be seeking indemnity costs. The 2nd Defendant’s counsel also stated that without prejudice to their strike out application they were willing to peruse the proposed amended statement of claim if sent to them by close of business on 23 August 2022 (annexure “AA-5” of the 2nd Defendant’s Affidavit in Support). There was no response from the Plaintiff’s counsel.
    1. On 24 August 2022, 2 days prior to the hearing of the strike out application, the Plaintiff’s counsel e-mailed the 2nd Defendant’s counsel. A copy of the e-mail is attached to the 2nd Defendant’s Affidavit in Support marked “AA-6” and I reproduce the contents of the e-mail below:

““without prejudice”

Greetings Sir

I have spoken to my client and he has confirmed that this matter can been withdrawn with an undertaking that no matters following from the same issue will be brought forward in court again. Also if parties can bare there own cost. This withdrawal will be limited to the action number 85 of 22 as your client and my client have a lot of issues on going before the High Court.

I look forward to you response in this matter


Thanking you

Jadhav Prakashan”


  1. Thereafter, the trail of e-mails that followed between the counsels for the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant is as follows:

25 August 2022 11:31 am (e-mail from 2nd defendant’s employee to plaintiff’s and 3rd defendant’s counsel):

“Subject: (A78) – King Anwar Hussein v Co opted Committee of the Association of the Fantasy Island Lesses & Ors LTKA HC Civil Action No. 85 of 2022

Good morning Mr Prakashan and Mr Lajendra,

We refer to Mr Narayan’s discussion with both Counsels in respect of the captioned matter.

Having taken instructions from our client, we have drawn up the Terms of Settlement. Attached is a copy. This will bring an end of the proceedings as requested by Mr Prakashan.

We request if you both could confirm by lunch time that the Terms of Settlement is in order so that we can cease with preparation for the hearing tomorrow.

Once confirmed we will have the copies printed and brought to Court for signing by Mr Prakashan and we suggest Mr Lajendra, if you can instruct your agents to sign on your firm’s behalf.


Your prompt responses will be appreciated.

Kind regards

Elizabeth Saverio

(Chief Legal Executive”


25 August 2022 11:37 am (e-mail from 2nd defendant’s counsel to plaintiff’s and 3rd defendant’s counsel):

“Hi all

Can I suggest Mr Prakashan print, execute and deliver to our office today in quadruplicate and Mr Lajendra’s agent can sign tomorrow in Court before handing to the Judge for order in terms.


Regards

Adish K Narayan”


25 August 2022 12:03 pm (e-mail from 3rd defendant’s counsel):

“Dear Mr Narayan

Thank you for our telephone discussion and the subsequent email attaching the draft Terms of Settlement.

We are taking instructions and will revert soon. Thanks

Nilesh Lajendra”


25 August 2022 2:19 pm (e-mail from plaintiff’s counsel to counsel’s for 2nd and 3rd defendant’s):


“Greetings

As discussed your terms of settlement covers matters which covers all lot of issues can I simply the terms by stating that the what ever issues pleaded in our current case will not be brought to court again and if brought this terms of settlement will act as a bar to the pleadings.

As I do not want to agree to something that I am not instructed in. So if I can amend the settlement and submit it to you

Thanking

Jadhav Prakashan”


25 August 2022 2.39 pm (e-mail from 2nd defendant’s employee to plaintiff’s and 3rd defendant’s counsel):

“Good afternoon Mr Prakashan

Your email below was referred to Mr Narayan and he has advised that the Terms of Settlement forwarded expresses in professional terms what you have said.

Please sign and deliver the same to us this afternoon failing which we will proceed with the hearing tomorrow.

Kind regards

Elizabeth Saverio

(Chief Legal Executive)”


25 August 2022 4:03 pm (e-mail from plaintiff’s counsel to 2nd and 3rd defendant’s counsel):

“please find attached the executed copy”


25 August 2022 11.31 am (e-mail from 2nd defendant’s counsel to plaintiff’s and 3rd defendant’s counsel):

“Thank you Mr Prakashan,

Both Mr Lajendra’s agent and we will attend to signing originals tomorrow at the High Court.

Regards

Adish K Narayan”


  1. Thereafter, on 26 August 2022 the Terms of Settlement were filed and court orders made as follows (Consent Orders):

“1. THAT the Plaintiff withdraws the action herein.

2. THAT the orders (including the injunction) granted on an ex-parte application by the Plaintiff on 8th April 2022, as subsequently extended, is unconditionally discharged.

3. THAT the Plaintiff undertakes that he will not bring any further or future action, suit or proceedings in any form or manner which directly or indirectly seeks to claim any relief or remedy based on the allegations or the subject matters (factual or otherwise) pleaded in his Statement of Claim against any party to the present action or any member, officials, executive, servant, agent contractor of the unincorporated association known as The Association of Fantasy Island Lessees.

4. THAT this Order may be pleaded in bar to any action, suit or proceedings now pending or hereafter commenced by the Plaintiff in respect of the matters in 3 above against any party to this action or any member, officials, executive, servant, agent and contractor of the unincorporated association known as The Association of Fantasy Island Lessees.

5. THAT the action herein is to be struck out/dismissed with no order as to costs.

SEALED at Lautoka this 12th day of September, 2022.”


Civil action no. HBC 302 and 303 of 2022


  1. The Plaintiff subsequently filed 2 separate actions being HBC 302 and 303 of 2022.
  2. In HBC 302 of 2022 (Hussain v Ali [2023] FJHC 630; HBC302.2022 (31 August 2023) filed between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant, the 2nd Defendant had filed an application to strike out the matter and the Judge in striking out the same had made certain findings as follows:

“15. I agree with the submissions of Mr. Narayan that a lawyer representing a client has general apparent authority to settle claims without the express authority of the client (Mathew v Munster [1887] UKLawRpKQB 189; (1888) 20 QBD 141; Tagra Spare Parts & Carwash (Fiji) Ltd v Khan [2017] FJHC 51; HBC09.2017 (1 February 2017). Any such consent judgment thus binds the client

16. If Hussein really asserts that Prakashan & Associates did enter into the Terms of Settlement without his instructions, then he must take action against his lawyers.

17. In addition to the above, we are here dealing with a Terms of Settlement which has been endorsed by the Court and which has become a Consent Order.

...

24. I also refuse to accept the allegation that Ali’s solicitors had threatened Hussein’s solicitors which then led to the Terms of Settlement. It is hard to see this as a situation where a lawyer is dominating the will of another lawyer. After all, as a fiduciary, it is a duty of every lawyer to look out for their client’s best interests.”


  1. HBC 303 of 2022 was also struck out by the Court on 31 August 2023.

Plaintiff’s current Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim


  1. The Plaintiff filed the current Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim on 21 August 2023 (Plaintiff’s Claim) claiming that he was not present in Court and did not have any knowledge of the Terms of Settlement entered into by the parties in HBC 85 of 2022. The Plaintiff further asserts that he did not instruct his previous solicitor as to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Consent Orders, and that the Plaintiff’s previous solicitor’s consent to the same was obtained by misrepresentation and coercion without the Plaintiff’s previous solicitor being allowed an opportunity to take instructions from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff thus claims for the Consent Orders to be varied to the extent that paragraphs 3 and 4 be excluded. The Plaintiff also seeks an alternate order which reads “alternatively that Plaintiff’s Solicitor on his own admissions lacked instructions of the Plaintiff to execute the Terms of Settlement as to Paragraphs 3 and 4.”

Order 18 Rule 18


  1. The law on striking out pleadings is well settled. Order 18 rule 18 of the High Court Rule gives the discretionary power to strike out the proceedings provides for grounds to do so. Order 18 rule 18 provides as follows:

“18 (1)The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the indorsement of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the indorsement, on the ground that –

(a) it discloses no reasonable case of action or defence, as the case may be;
(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;
(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or
(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court,

and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.”


  1. The following excerpts from the 1997 Supreme Court Practice provide the scope of the rule together with guiding factors when dealing with an application for the strike out of a pleading.
  2. Footnote 18/19/3 of the 1997 Supreme Court Practice reads:

“Striking out or amendment—The rule also empowers the Court to amend any pleading or indorsement or any matter therein. If a statement of claim does not disclose a cause of action relied on, an opportunity to amend may be given, though the formulation of the amendment is not before the Court (CBS Songs Ltd v. Amstrad [1987] R.P.C. 417 and [1987] R.P.C. 429). But unless there is reason to suppose that the case can be improved by amendment, leave will not be given (Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1898] UKLawRpKQB 176; [1899] 1 Q.B. 86, p.94, C.A.). Where the statement of claim presented discloses no cause of action because some material averment has been omitted, the Court, while striking out the pleading, will not dismiss the action, but give the plaintiff leave to amend (see “Amendment,” para. 18/12/22), unless the Court is satisfied that no amendment will cure the defect (Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co. [1887] UKLawRpCh 186; (1887) 36 Ch.D. 489).”


  1. Footnote 18/19/7 of the 1997 Supreme Court Practice reads:

“Exercise of powers under this rule—It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse 18/19/7 should be had to the summary process under this rule, per Lindley M.R. in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1898] UKLawRpKQB 176; [1899] 1 Q.B. 86, p.91 (Mayor, etc., of the City of London v. Horner (1914) 111 L.T. 512, C.A.). See also Kemsley v. Foot [1951] 2 K.B. 34; [1951] 1 All E.R. 331, C.A., affirmed [1952] A.C. 345, H.L. It cannot be exercised by a minute and protracted examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the plaintiff really has a cause of action (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1238; [1965] 2 All E.R. 871, C.A.).”


  1. Footnote 18/19/11 of the 1997 Supreme Court Practice on no reasonable cause of action or defence reads:

“Principles—A reasonable cause of action means a cause of action with some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleading are considered (per Lord Pearson in Drummond-Jackson v. British Medical Association [1970] 1 W.L.R. 688; [1970] 1 All E.R. 1094, C.A.). So long as the statement of claim or the particulars (Davey v. Bentinck [1892] UKLawRpKQB 216; [1893] 1 Q.B. 185) disclose some cause of action, or raise some question fit to be decided by a Judge or a jury, the mere fact that the case is weak, and not likely to succeed, is no ground for striking it out (Moore v. Lawson (1915) 31 T.L.R. 418, C.A.; Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1238; [1965] 2 All E.R. 871, C.A.);...”


  1. The legal principles regarding striking out pleadings are clear and widely understood. The Court of Appeal in National MBF Finance v Buli [2000] FJCA 28 determined the principles for strike out. In Attorney-General v Shiu Prasad Halka 18 FLR 210 at 214 Justice Gould V.P. in his judgment expressed “that the summary procedure under O.18, r.19 is to be sparingly used and is not appropriate to cases involving difficult and complicated questions of law.”
  2. Justice Winter (as his Lordship then was) in Ah Koy v Native Land Trust Board [2005] FJHC 49 aptly stated:

“The practice in Fiji of preemptively applying to strike out a claim is wrong and must cease. Counsels ability to overlook the purpose of this summary procedure is astounding. The expense to the administration of justice, let alone clients, is a shameful waste of resources....


Apart from truly exceptional cases the remedy should not be granted. The approach to such applications is to assume that the factual basis on which the allegations contained in the pleadings are raised will be provided at trial. If a legal issue can be raised on the facts as pleaded then the courts will not strike out a pleading and will certainly not do so upon a contention that the facts cannot be proved unless the situation is so strong that judicial notice can be taken of the falsity of such a factual contention....

The rule of law requires the existence of courts for the determination of disputes and that litigants have the right to use the court for that purpose. The courts will be alert to their processes being used in a way that results in an oppression or injustice that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. However, the court cannot and must not deny proper access to justice by the glib use of a summary procedure to pre-emptorily strike out an action no matter how weak or poorly pleaded the Statement of Claim supporting the case is....


It is not for the court in deciding whether there is a reasonable cause of action to go into the details of the issues that are raised by the parties. This summary jurisdiction of the court was never intended to be exercised by a detailed examination of the facts of the case at a mini hearing to see whether the plaintiff really has a good cause of action merely a sufficient one. This is not the time for an assessment of the strengths of either case. That task is reserved for trial. The simple fact that these parties engaged in argument by opinion over statutory interpretation must bring into existence a mere cause of action raising some questions fit to be decided by a judge.”


  1. The clear and unambiguous wording of Order 18 Rule 18 indicates that the power to strike out pleadings is discretionary rather than obligatory. The general principle is that an order for strike out should only be made where it is plain and obvious that the claim or defence cannot succeed.

2nd Defendant’s position


  1. The following submissions were made by the 2nd Defendant’s counsel pertaining to the 2nd Defendant’s position:
    1. That the Plaintiff’s previous counsel had in fact acted in accordance with the Plaintiff’s instructions in HBC 85 of 2022, which is evidenced by the e-mails from the Plaintiff’s previous counsel.
    2. That the pleadings do not disclose a reasonable cause of action as it is trite law that solicitors have ostensible or apparent authority to act for their clients even in the absence of express instructions. The counsel relied on Tagra Spare Parts & Carwash (Fiji) Ltd v Khan [2017] FJHC 51; HBC09.2017 (1 February 2017) and Deo v Kumar [2014] FJHC 648; HBC122.2013 (8 September 2014).
    1. That the pleadings have not particularised the alleged “threat or coercion” against the 2nd Defendant, and that in the absence of the same the Court cannot act on mere conjecture or speculation.
    1. That if the Plaintiff’s previous counsel had indeed been threatened, he would have immediately moved to set aside the Consent Orders. The Plaintiff only filed the current action when his subsequent claims (being Civil Action No. 302 and 303 of 2022) were struck out due to breach of the Consent Orders.

Plaintiff’s position


  1. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted that the Plaintiff’s previous solicitor in HBC 85 of 2022 did not have the authority to agree to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Consent Orders. The counsel relies on paragraph 2 of the e-mail of 25 August 2022 from the Plaintiff’s previous solicitor wherein the previous solicitor wrote and I quote, “As I do not want to agree to something that I am not instructed in...if I can amend the Terms of Settlement and submit to you...”.
  2. It ought to be noted that the preceding paragraph to paragraph 2 of the said e-mail of 25 August 2022 states the following: “As discussed your terms of settlement covers matters which covers all lot of issues can I simply the terms by stating that the what ever issues pleaded in our current case will not be brought to court again and if brought this terms of settlement will act as a bar to the pleadings.” The Plaintiff’s counsel’s submissions on the isolated paragraph 2 of the e-mail does not adequately address the Court on the meaning and intention of the writer when both paragraphs of the said e-mail are analysed holistically.
  3. Plaintiff’s Counsel has also not submitted on the Plaintiff’s former counsel’s earlier e-mail of 24 August 2022, which was apparently the beginning of settlement talks in HBC 85 of 2022 wherein the Plaintiff’s former counsel had clearly stated that and I quote “I have spoken to my client and he has confirmed that this matter can been withdrawn with an undertaking that no matters following from the same issue will be brought forward in court again. Also if parties can bare there own cost. This withdrawal will be limited to the action number 85 of 22 as your client and my client have a lot of issues on going before the High Court.”.
  4. The Plaintiff’s counsel further submitted that the 2nd Defendant’s counsel had knowledge of the lack of authority from the Plaintiff to his former solicitor. Counsel relies on the trail of e-mails referred to in paragraph 6 (d) above to support this position.
  5. Whilst the Plaintiff’s claim had raised more than one issue for the Court’s consideration, during the hearing of the Summons, the Plaintiff’s counsel advised this Court that the Plaintiff was only proceeding with the issue relating to the Plaintiff’s former solicitor acting without instructions of the Plaintiff in obtaining the Consent Orders thereby reducing the number of issues to be considered by this Court to just one.
  6. Relying on Sharma v Sili [2022] FJCA 123; ABU131.2018 (30 September 2022) the Plaintiff’s counsel submitted that since the Plaintiff’s former solicitor lacked instructions, the Court was misled into approving a settlement that included terms which the Plaintiff had not consented to and as such, the Consent Orders should be set aside.
  7. The Plaintiff’s counsel, while relying on the case of Sharma v Sili [supra], failed to consider that the Court of Appeal had held as follows therein:


“[36] In my view, in Sharma v Caldwell (supra), the Magistrate’s consent was a condition precedent to the entering of the terms of settlement, because the settlement related to an infant. In the appeal that is before this court, no such condition precedent exists. In this case, the 1st Respondent as beneficiary of the Consent Judgment only sought to enforce it. The reason the Appellant objects to this is his belated allegation that the Consent Judgement was obtained by fraud and undue influence exerted upon him by his lawyers, as well as the lawyers of the Appellant.

[37] In my view, it is significant that the Appellant does not allege that the 1st Respondent misled him or induced him against his will. The Appellant’s complaint is against the lawyers. Therefore, if at all such an action is maintainable, it would be one for breach of professional duties, and it does not in any way impinge upon the legal right of the 1st Respondent to enjoy the benefit of the Consent Judgment. Therefore, the facts of Sharma v Caldwell (supra) can be distinguished from the facts of this case, and the Appellant’s submission in this regard is rejected.

...

[46] A consent judgment is a judgment entered upon the merits, it is not a default judgment. When parties to a judgment opt freely and without compulsion to enter terms of settlement, which is made a judgment of court, it is no longer open to a court to adjudicate the subject matter of the dispute. Consent can be presumed if the parties were represented by Counsel. The doctrine of estoppel would operate, to preclude the re-opening of the matters settled. This is in the interest of finality, which is a cornerstone of public policy. A consent judgment then is a contract between the parties whereby rights are created between them in substitution for an order of court. It amounts to an abandonment of the original claim and is intended to put an end to the existing litigation between the parties. A consent judgment is as effective as a judgment delivered after contest and a consideration by the court of the merits of the dispute.”

[Emphasis added]


Analysis


  1. In this matter the Plaintiff’s main contention is that the Plaintiff’s former solicitor had acted without instructions of the Plaintiff (which is the only issue to be adjudicated upon), and thus this Court need not look into the other grounds which can invalidate a consent order viz. mistake, illegality, duress or misrepresentation (see Tagra Spare Parts [supra])
  2. The said issue has already been decided by Tuilevuka J in HBC 302 of 2022 Hussain v Ali [2023] FJHC 630 wherein His Lordship held that “a lawyer representing a client has general apparent authority to settle claims without the express authority of the clients...Any such consent judgement thus binds the client. If Hussein really asserts that Prakashan & Associates did enter into the Terms of Settlement without his instructions, then he must take action against his lawyers.” The said decision is final, and the matter is Res Judicata. This Court is also of the same view and will not address the same issue again.
  3. The Plaintiff’s counsel submitted that the inclusion of paragraphs 3 and 4 in the Consent Orders creates an unjustifiable restraint on future legal rights and bars all future claims against the Defendants. This argument is completely flawed as paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Consent Orders only restricts the Plaintiff in a limited sense, that is from initiating future proceedings against the Defendants concerning the same issues already raised in the Statement of Claim filed in Civil Action No. HBC 85 of 2022. The said paragraphs do not outright bar the Plaintiff from claims against the Defendants that are unrelated to Civil Action No. HBC 85 of 2022.
  4. Even if the Court were to grant leave to the Plaintiff to amend his pleadings, it would be a futile exercise as the Court in HBC 302 of 2022 has already dealt with the said issue and held that the Plaintiff should be taking action against his former solicitor if the Plaintiff really asserts that the Consent Orders were entered into without his instructions.
  5. In relation to hopeless proceedings, footnote 18/19/16 of the 1997 Supreme Court Practice reads:

“(4) Hopeless proceedings- Where proceedings which were viable when instituted have by reason of subsequent events become inescapably doomed to failure, they may be dismissed as being an abuse of the process of the Court (Domer v. Gulf Oil (Great Britain) [1975] 119 S.J. 392).”


  1. The Plaintiff’s Claim was filed on 21 August 2023. The decision by Tuilevuka J in HBC 302 of 2022 Hussain v Ali [2023] FJHC 630 was delivered a few days later on 31 August 2023. Therefore, the Plaintiff was aware of the decision of Tuilevuka J on the issue of the alleged lack of instructions to the Plaintiff’s former solicitor from 31 August 2023 onwards. Despite having this knowledge, the Plaintiff continued to maintain the said claim against the Defendants on the same issue of lack of instructions.
  2. For the aforementioned reasons, I find that the Plaintiff’s Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and that the Plaintiff has abused the process of this Court by continuing with this action after the decision of Tuilevuka J in HBC 302 of 2022 Hussain v Ali [2023] FJHC 630. This conduct of the Plaintiff warrants an order for costs at a high scale if not on indemnity basis.
  3. Accordingly, I make the following orders:
(a) The Plaintiff’s Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim is hereby struck out; and

(b) 2nd Defendant is entitled to costs summarily assessed in the amount of $2,500.00, payable by the Plaintiff within 1 month of today.

P. Prasad

Master of the High Court

At Lautoka
31 July 2025


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