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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT AT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
Civil Action No. 161 of 2018
BETWEEN
VIJAY KUMAR of 23 Kisdon Cresent, Prospect, NSW 2148, Australia,
Warehouse Manager.
FIRST PLAINTIFF
AND
HARI PRASAD of lot 1 Chanik Place, Caubati, Nasinu, Fiji,
Retired Accounts Clerk.
SECOND PLAINTIFF
AND
VINESH PRASAD of Lot 10 Tamavua, Suva, Fuji, Estimator.
FIRST DEFENDANT
AND
THE REGISTRAR OF TITLES of Civic Tower, Suva.
SECOND DEFENDANT
AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI
THIRD DEFENDANT
Counsel : Mr Nadan A. for the Plaintiffs.
Ms Saumatua S. with Ms Disiga F. for the 1st Defendant.
Ms Singh P. for the 2nd & 3rd Defendants.
Date of Hearing : 01st July 2020
Date of Ruling : 20th July 2020
RULING
(On the application for Striking out)
[1] The plaintiffs instituted these proceedings alleging that the 2nd defendant had fraudulently transferred undivided half share of the property which is the subject matter of these proceeding onto himself.
[2] The plaintiff in the statement of claim sought the following reliefs:
[3] Particulars of fraud as alleged by the plaintiffs in their statement of claim are as follows:
[4] The plaintiffs has prayed inter alia, for a declaration that the said transfer be deemed null and void and of no legal effect.
[5] On 21st January 2020 the 1st defendant filed a summons pursuant to Order 18 rule 18 of the High Court Rules seeking to have the plaintiffs’ claim against the defendants struck out.
[6] Order 18 rule 18(1) of the High Court Rules 1988 provides:
The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the indorsement of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the indorsement, on the ground that-
(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; or
(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or
(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or
(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court;
and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.
In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 3) [1970] Ch 506 it was held that the power given to strike out any pleading or any Part of a pleading under this rule is not mandatory but permissive, and confers a discretionary jurisdiction to be exercised having regard to the quality and all the circumstances relating to the offending plea.
In Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 W.L.R. 688; [1970] 1 All ER 1094 it was held;
Over a long period of years it has been firmly established by many authorities that the power to strike out a statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action is a summary power which should be exercised only in plain and obvious cases.
In the case of Walters v Sunday Pictorial Newspapers Limited [1961] 2 All ER 761 it was held:
It is well established that the drastic remedy of striking out a pleading or, part of a pleading, cannot be resorted to unless it is quite clear that the pleading objected to, discloses no arguable case. Indeed, it has been conceded before us that the Rule is applicable only in plain and obvious cases.
In Narawa v Native Land Trust Board [2003] FJHC 302; HBC0232d.1995s (11 July 2003) the court made the flowing observations:
In the context of this case I find the following statement of Megarry V.C. in Gleeson v J. Wippell & Co. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 510 at 518 apt:
“First, there is the well-settled requirement that the jurisdiction to strike out an endorsement or pleading, whether under the rules or under the inherent jurisdiction, should be exercised with great caution, and only in plain and obvious cases that are clear beyond doubt. Second, Zeiss No. 3 [1970] Ch. 506 established that, as had previously been assumed, the jurisdiction under the rules is discretionary; even if the matter is or may be res judicata, it may be better not to strike out the pleadings but to leave the matter to be resolved at the trial”.
[7] Particulars of fraud alleged to have been committed by the 1st defendant as averred in the statement of claim are as follows:
[8] The learned counsel for the 1st defendant submits that the plaintiffs has failed to provide evidence of fraud to substantiate the allegation of fraud made against the 1st defendant.
[9] There is no requirement in law to produce evidence in court before the matter is taken up for trial. Pleading are no evidence. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove the allegations of fraud at the hearing of the mater by adducing evidence. The question here is whether the statement of claim discloses a reasonable cause of action. In an action of this nature all what the plaintiff can aver in the statement of claim is that his signature was obtained fraudulently. Whether a fraud was perpetrated on him is purely a matter of evidence. Therefore it cannot be said that the plaintiff has failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.
[10] The learned counsel for the 1st defendant also submits that the plaintiffs’ action is an abuse of the process of the court. I do not see any reason to say the proceedings instituted by the plaintiffs is abuse of the process of the court because from the statement of claim it is clear that the plaintiffs have a reasonable cause of action.
[11] The court is of the view that this is not a matter that should be summarily dismissed. From the decisions I have cited above it is very clear that courts are discouraged to a very great extent in striking out matters without hearing the parties.
Orders
Lyone Seneviratne
JUDGE
20th July 2020
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