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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
WESTERN DIVISION
AT LAUTOKA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
CIVIL ACTION NO. HBC 68 of 2012
BETWEEN :
AUSFURN FIJI LIMITED a duly incorporated limited liability company having its registered office at Nadi.
PLAINTIFF
A N D :
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Government Buildings Suva
1ST DEFENDANT
A N D :
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Attorney General’s Chambers, Suva.
2ND DEFENDANT
A N D :
MATRIX ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS LIMITED a duly incorporated limited liability company having its registered office at Nadi.
3RD DEFENDANT
A N D :
PETER MICHAEL McGAHAN a Company Director of Nadi
4TH DEFENDANT
(Ms) Barbra Doton Jai for the Plaintiff
Mr.Nilesh Virendra Kumar for theThird and Fourth Defendants
Date of Hearing:- Tuesday,31st May 2016
Date of Ruling:-Friday,10th June 2016
RULING
(A) INTRODUCTION
(1) The matter before me stems from the Plaintiff’s ‘Notice of Motion’, dated 25th November 2015, made pursuant to Order 8, r.2 of the High Court Rules, 1988 and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court seeking the grant of the following Orders;
1. THAT the within action be reinstated and the matter be relisted in the cause list.
2. THAT the costs of the application be costs in the cause.
3. THAT any other orders that this Court deem.
(2) The Plaintiff is a limited liability company. The application for reinstatement is supported by an affidavit sworn by one “Ronnie Ram”, Legal Executive, employed by Rams Law, Solicitors for the Plaintiff.
(3) The First and Second Defendants do not oppose the application. But the application is strongly resisted by the third and fourth Defendants.
(4) The third and fourth Defendants filed an ‘affidavit in opposition’ opposing the application followed by an ‘affidavit in reply’ thereto.
(5) The Plaintiff and the third and fourth Defendants were heard on the ‘Notice of Motion’. They made oral submissions to Court. In addition to oral submissions, the Counsel for the Plaintiff filed a careful and comprehensive written submission for which I am most grateful.
(B) CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
10th April 2012 The Plaintiff instituted the proceedings herein against the Defendants.
10th April 2012 The Plaintiff filed an Inter-Parte Summons seeking, inter alia, injunctive relief against the Defendants.
24th May 2012 Third & Fourth Defendants filed Statement of Defence and Counterclaim.
12th June 2012 Plaintiff filed Reply to Third & Fourth Defendant’s Statement of Defence and Counterclaim.
4th July 2012 First and Second Defendant filed Statement of Defence.
12th July 2012 Plaintiff filed reply to Defence of First and Second Defendant.
9th August 2012 Plaintiff filed Summons for Directions.
17th September 2012 Court granted Orders on Summons for Directions.
19th September 2012 Plaintiff sealed the Order on Summons for Directions.
8th October 2012 Plaintiff filed an Affidavit Verifying List of Documents.
1st November 2012 Third and Fourth Defendants filed an Affidavit Verifying List of Documents.
30th January 2013 First & Second Defendant filed Summons to Amend the Statement of Defence. First & Second Defendant filed Amended Statement of Defence without leave.
2nd May 2013 The Plaintiff’s application for injunction was heard before the Master of the High Court and the solicitors for the Third & Fourth Defendants informed the Court that there is a mortgage already registered on the subject property.
6th may 2013 The Fourth Defendant filed Supplementary Affidavit with the registered mortgage attached.
7th August 2013 Plaintiff filed application to amend the Inter-Parte Summons.
11th June 2014 Plaintiff was granted leave to amend the Inter-Parte Summons.
6th November 2014 Hearing of Plaintiff’s injunction application before Justice A. Tuilevuka. Injunction refused.
13th May 2015 Plaintiff filed an Amended reply to Amended Statement of Defence of First and Second Defendants.
29th June 2015 First and Second Defendants filedan Affidavit Verifying List of Documents.
2nd July 2015 Court gave directions for exchange of documents.
26th August 2015 Court gave directions for filing of PTC Minutes by 23rd September 2015.
24th September 2015 Court granted leave for Plaintiff to file Supplementary Affidavit Verifying List of Documents and gave directions to file PTC Minutes thereafter.
16th October 2015 Plaintiff filed a Supplementary Affidavit Verifying List of Documents.
27th October 2015 Matter adjourned to 4th November 2015.
4th November 2015 No appearance by the Plaintiff. NOAH issued.
16th November 2015 Second consecutive non-appearance by the Plaintiff. Matter taken off the cause - list.
25th November 2015 Plaintiff filed the application herein for reinstatement of the matter.
(C) THE PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT
The Plaintiff is a limited liability company. The plaintiff’s ‘Notice of Motion’ is supported by an affidavit sworn by one ‘Ronnie Ram’, Legal Executive, employed by Rams Law, Solicitors for the Plaintiff, which is substantially as follows;
(D) AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION
The fourth Defendant, ‘Peter Michael McGhan’, who is also a Director of third Defendant filed an “affidavit in opposition” sworn on 01st March 2016, which is substantially as follows;
(E) AFFIDAVIT IN REPLY
The Plaintiff filed an ‘affidavit in reply’ by Ronnie Ram, litigation Clerk from its Solicitors firm, sworn on 29th March 2016, which is substantially as follows;
(F) ANALYSIS
(1) At the commencement of the hearing before the Court, the Counsel for the third and fourth Defendants raised objections to the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for reinstatement and the affidavit in support of the law Clerk on the following grounds;
(i) The Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion is irregular because Order 8, r.2of the High Court Rules, 1988 cannot be applied for an application for reinstatement.
(ii) The supporting affidavit contains material which is pure hearsay.
(iii) The application for reinstatement of the action is a contested hearing, it is not appropriate for a law clerk to depose in support of it.
(2) Let me now move to consider the first objection, viz,Notice of Motion is irregular.
The Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for re-instatement is made pursuant to Order 8, r.2
It was contended by the 3rd and 4th Defendants that Notice of Motion is irregular because Order 8, r.2 cannot be applied for an application for reinstatement of an action.
Let me have a close look at Order 8, r.2
Order 8, r.2 provides;
Notice of Motion (O.8, r.2)
2.-(1) Except where an application by motion may properly be made ex parte, no motion shall ne made without previous notice to the parties affected thereby, but the Court, if satisfied that the delay caused by proceedings in the ordinary way would or might entail irreparable or serious mischief may make an order ex parte on such terms as to costs or otherwise, and subject to such understanding, if any, as it thinks just; and any party affected by such order may apply to the Court to set it aside.
(2) Unless the Court gives leave to the contrary, there must be at least 2 clear days between the service of notice of a motion and the day named in the notice for hearing the motion.
The wording of Order 8, r.2 is perfectly clear to me. Order 8, r.2 contains provisions relating to ‘Notice of Motions’ and it makes no provision for reinstatement. The Plaintiff’s application for reinstatement should have been made pursuant to Order 32, r.6.This is not disputed by the Counsel for the Plaintiff. There is a world of difference between general provisions relating to ‘Notice of Motions’ from an application to reinstate an action.
In any event, the third and fourth Defendant’s objection must fail because of the delay involved.
Order 2, r.2 provides that an application to set aside any proceedings for irregularity shall not be allowed unless it is made within a reasonable time and before the party applying has taken any fresh step after becoming aware of the irregularity. The requirements are cumulative. Since the application is not made within a reasonable time, the application will not be allowed. If the Defendants had considered that the ‘Notice of Motion’ was in an irregularity, they could have moved under Order 2, r.2 before they filed an Affidavit in Opposition. Instead, they did not do so. They have waived their right by filing an Affidavit in Opposition. It is now too late to raise such an argument even if it had any validity.
For the sake of completeness, Order 2, r.2 is reproduced below in full.
Application to set aside for irregularity (O.2, r.2)
2.-(1) An Application to set aside for irregularity any proceedings, any step taken in any proceedings or any documents, judgment or order therein shall not be allowed unless it is made within a reasonable time and before the party applying has taken any fresh step after becoming aware of the irregularity.
(2) An application under this rule may be made by summons or motion and the grounds of objection must be stated in the summons or notice of motion.
The need for and the importance of complying with the Rules were emphasised as far back as 1983 by the Court in “Kenneth John Hart v Air Pacific Ltd”, Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1983.
In 1995, theSupreme Court, the highest Court in the land warned; “We now stress, however, that the Rules are there to be obeyed. In future practitioners must understand that they are on notice that noncompliance may well be fatal to an appeal” See;Venkatamma v Ferrier –Watson, Civil Appeal No. CBV 0002 of 1992 at p.3 of the judgment.
In August, 1997, the Court of Appeal in Hon Major General Sitiveni rabuka & Others v Ratu Viliame Dreunimisimisi & Others (Civil Appeal No. ABU0011 of 1997) held as follows-
“In all the circumstances, having regard to the history of the proceedings in the High Court and bearing in mind what the Supreme Court said in Venkatamma, we have decided that the proper course for us to follow now is to reject the application for further time to comply with rule 17 and to dismiss the appeal.”
In the decision of the Privy Council inRatnam v Cumarasamy and Another [1964] 3 All E.R. at page 935;
Lord Guest in giving the opinion of the Board to the Head of Malaysia said, inter alia:
“The rules of court must, Prima facie, be obeyed, and, in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken, there must be some material on which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified right to an extension of time which would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to provide a time table for the conduct of litigation. The only material before the Court of Appeal was the Affidavit of the appellant. The grounds there stated were that he did not instruct his solicitor until a day before the record of appeal was due to be lodged, and that his reason for this delay was that he hoped for a compromise. Their lordships are satisfied that the Court of Appeal was entitled to take the view that this did not constitute material on which they could exercise their discretion in favour of the appellant. In these circumstances, their lordships find it impossible to say that the discretion of the Court of appeal was exercised on any wrong principle.”
(Emphasis Added)
On the strength of the authority in the above judicial decisions, I wish to emphasise that the rules are there to be followed and non-compliance with those rules is fatal.Therefore, I reject the first objection raised by the third and fourth Defendants.
(3) Now let me move to consider the second objection raised by the 3rd and 4th Defendants.
It was contended by the 3rd and 4th Defendants that the Affidavit in Support of the law Clerk contains material which is pure hearsay.
Counsel for the 3rd and 4th Defendant relies on a passage in the law Clerk’s Affidavit. It is in para (9). The para (9) is this;
“THAT later during the day on the 16th day of November 2015 I received a call from Mr. Charan of Aman Ravindra Singh Lawyers advising that he was late to court due to his travel from Ba and as a result could not appear in the above matter which was subsequently struck out for our non- appearance.”
Counsel for the 3rd and 4th Defendant asserted that in the absence of an Affidavit from Mr. Charan deposing as to the reason for non-appearance on the 16th November 2015, no reliance could be placed on the Statement in the Affidavit of the law clerk, referring to the reason for non appearance on the 16th November 2015. Counsel seeks to strike out para (9) in the Affidavit of the Law Clerk which is intended to be used by the Plaintiff.
In ‘adverso’, the Counsel for the Plaintiff submits that RHC Order 41, r.5 (2) provides for an exception in interlocutory proceedings, permitting the inclusion of hearsay and secondary evidence in Affidavits filed in such proceedings.
It is, of course, true that the Statement made to the law Clerk by Mr. Charan explaining the reason for non appearance on 16th November 2015 is hearsay in the absence of an Affidavit from Mr. Charan deposing as to the reason for non-appearance. This is not disputed by the Counsel for the Plaintiff. The Counsel for the Plaintiff submits that the Court in the exercise of its discretion under RHC Order 41, r. 5(2) should not accede to the 3rd and 4th Defendant’s application, because this is interlocutory proceedings.
I acknowledge the force of the submission of the Counsel for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for reinstatement of the action is a true interlocutory proceeding.
Let me have a close look at RHC Order 41, r.5.
Order 41, r.5 provides;
Contents of affidavit (O.41, r.5)
5.-(1) Subject to Order 14, rules 2 (2) and 4 (2), to Order 86, rule 2 (1), to paragraph (2) of this rule and to any order made under
Order 38, rule 3, an Affidavit may contain only such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove.
(2) An affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in interlocutory proceedings may contain statements of information or belief with the sources and grounds thereof.
The wording of Order 41, r.5 (2) is perfectly clear to me; “An Affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in interlocutory proceedings may contain statements of information or belief with the source and ground thereof.”
It is obvious from r.5 (2) itself that it operates as an exception from the primary rule of evidence stated expressly in Order 41, r.5 (1) that a person may only give evidence as the “facts” which he ‘is able of his own knowledge to prove’. r.5 (2), by including Statements of information or belief plainly allows the adduction of hearsay. But such Statements will have no ‘probative value’ unless the sources and grounds of the information and belief are revealed. The purpose of r.5 (2) is to enable a deponent to put before the Court in interlocutory proceedings, frequently in circumstances of great urgency, facts which he is not able of his own knowledge to provide but which, the deponent is informed and believes, can be provided by means which the deponent identifies by specifying the original sources and grounds of his information and belief. By having to reveal original source (not the immediate source), the deponent affords a proper opportunity to another party to challenge and counter such evidence, as well as enabling the Court to assess the weight to be attributed to such evidence.
The importance of these dual disclosures is obvious as was stated by Lord Alverstone C.J. over a century ago in J.L Young Manufacturing Co. Ltd. V J.L. Young Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1900] UKLawRpCh 177; (1900) 2 Ch. 753 at 754:
‘In my opinion some of the affidavits in this case are wholly worthless and not to be relied upon. I notice that in several
instances the deponents make statements on their ‘Information and belief’ without saying what their source of information
and belief is, and in many respects what they so state is not confirmed in any way. In my opinion so-called evidence on ‘information
and belief’ ought not to be looked at at all, not only unless the Court can ascertain the source of the information and belief
but also unless the deponent’s statement is corroborated by someone who speaks from his own knowledge. If such affidavits
are made in future, it is as well that it should be understood that they are worthless and ought not to be received in evidence in
any shape whatever.’
Returning back to the instant case, as noted earlier, the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for reinstatement of the action is a true ‘interlocutory proceeding.”
As noted above, r. 5 (2) provides for an exception in interlocutory proceedings, permitting the inclusion of hearsay and secondary evidence in Affidavits filed in such proceedings. The relaxation is allowed only if the deponent discloses ‘the original source’ of his information and ‘the grounds’ of his belief.
I keep well in my mind the paragraph in question, viz, para (9) of the law Clerk’s Affidavit in Support which is in this form;
“THAT later during the day on the 16th day of November 2015 I received a call from Mr. Charan of Aman Ravindra Singh Lawyers advising that he was late to court due to his travel from Ba and as a result could not appear in the above matter which was subsequently struck out for our non- appearance.”
The Statement made by Mr .Charan is highly relevant to the interlocutory proceeding before me.
The deponent, viz,law Clerk has clearly identified the original source to him of his information. This is sufficient in order to comply with r.5 (2) that the deponent should identify original source to him of his information. Therefore, I have reached the clear conclusion that paragraph (9) of the Law Clerk’s Affidavit is relevant, because it contain material admissible by virtue of Order 41, r.5 (2) in interlocutory proceedings.
It is for the Court hearing the motion to decide whether any and if so what weight should be attached to that material.
For the reasons which I have endeavoured to explain, I do not uphold the second objection.
(4) Let me now move to consider the third objection raised by the 3rdand 4th Defendants, viz,law Clerks swear affidavits on behalf of Clients.
The affidavit in support of the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for reinstatement is sworn by a law Clerk employed by the Plaintiff’s Solicitors.
It was contended by the 3rd and 4th Defendant that the application for reinstatement of the Plaintiff’s claim is a contested hearing and it is not appropriate for a law clerk to depose in support of it. In the same breath, the counsel for the third and fourth Defendants contended that the law clerks of Solicitors are neither litigants nor competent legal persons to swear in contested legal matters. (It is not in dispute that the Plaintiff’s application for reinstatement is a contested hearing.)
I acknowledge the force of the submission by the Counsel for the third and fourth Defendants.
In this, I am comforted by the rule of law expounded in the following judicial decisions:-
In the case ofDr. Ramon Fermin Angco v Dr. Sachida Mudaliar & Others, Lautoka High Court Civil Action No. 26 of 1997, the Court on page 3 stated;
“The Court will disregard the affidavit sworn by Yogesh Narayan. As a practice it is quite improper that law clerks swear affidavits on behalf of clients. Proceedings such as the present are matters in which the latter ought more appropriately to be involved. Too often solicitors allow their law clerks to swear affidavits because it is all too convenient. Such conduct must be discouraged. It trespasses the demarcation between client and solicitor roles.”
I reiterate here the comments of Hon. Mr. Justice Jiten Singh in Deo v Singh [2005] FJHC 23; HBC0423.2004 (10 February 2005):
“The swearing of affidavits by solicitor’s clerks in contested proceedings with alarming regularity before the courts. Arun Kumar says he was duly authorised by defendants to dispose the contents. There is no authority annexed to the affidavit. Order 41 Rule 1 sub-rule 4 requires affidavit to be expressed in “first person”. The affidavit put before the court is more like a statement defence in its wording rather than being expressed in first person. Swearing of affidavit by solicitor’s clerk on contested matters should be a rare exception and the reason why the party is unable to depose ought to be explained”.
Master Robinson in Chand v Hussein [2009] FJHC 286; Civil Action 17. 2007 {14 October 2009) warned of the inherent danger in such practice:
“I do not wish to delve into the possible implications of solicitor’s clerks swearing affidavits on behalf of clients except as to say that personal knowledge of the facts by the deponent is a necessary ingredient”.
In the case of ‘Rupeni Silimuana Momoivlau v Telecom Fiji Ltd’, Civil Action No. HBC 527 of 1992, Hon. Justice Gerad Winter held;
The habit of supporting or opposing applications to decide the rights of parties based on the information and belief of law clerks is an embarrassment to the clerk, her firm and the court file. Justice Madraiwiwi (as he then was) had this to say about the practice of using law clerks in this way:
“It is being made clear to counsel that affidavits by law clerks were not being entertained other than in non contentious matters such as service of documents where not disputed. The most appropriate person to have sworn the affidavit in these proceedings was Mr. Joji Boseiwaqa who appeared on instructions from the plaintiff at the relevant time. The court respectfully endorses the general thrust of dicta by Lyons J in Michael Harvey v Michael Kelly & Ray McGill, Civil Action No. HBC 323 of 1077 about the propriety of law clerks deposing affidavits”.
I have no hesitation whatsoever in relying on the above Judicial decisions in the instant matter before me.
Applying those principles to the present case and carrying those principles to its logical conclusion, I have no hesitation in concluding that the affidavit of the law clerk filed in support of the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for reinstatement is unacceptable. Thus, I uphold the third objection. Therefore, the whole of the affidavit is removed from the court record. This may leave the court with no option but to dismiss the Notice of Motion, since there is no valid affidavit explaining the reasons for plaintiff’s non appearance in court on 04th November 2015 and 16th November 2015.
This should be made clear; I am not prepared to hallow an irregular practice. It is not the function of this Court. The Plaintiff should clothe the practice in the garment of legal acceptability!!!
Leave allthat aside for a moment.
As noted earlier, the Plaintiff is a duly incorporated limited liability company having its registered office at Nadi. The affidavit in support of the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion is sworn by a law Clerk of Plaintiff’s Solicitors. The law Clerk needs the sanction of the Plaintiff Company to swear on behalf of the Plaintiff Company. But the law Clerk does not annex any authority given to him by the Company. As a result, I am left with the conclusion that the lawClerk’s Affidavit is defective and a nullity because there is no ‘ostensible’ authority to prove that the law Clerk was duly authorised to swear on behalf of the Plaintiff Company. Therefore, I give it no weight whatsoever. I find considerable support for my view from the Supreme Court Practice.
In the Supreme Court Practice (1967) (The White Book) the following note appears at page 117:
‘The affidavit may be made by the Plaintiff or by any person duly authorised to make it. If not made by the Plaintiff, the affidavit itself must state that the person making it is duly authorised to do so- Chingwin –v- Russell (1910) 27 T.L.R. 21”.
Moreover, I am comforted by the rule of law expounded in “Chul v Doo Won Industrial (Fiji) Ltd (2004) FJHC 24. Hon Justice Jitoko held;
“The applicant himself is not a director. Any action taken on behalf of the Company, including this present application can only be done by a director under the seal of the Company. A director is a creature of the articles of association of the Company, as well as the Act. His duties and responsibilities are specifically set out in the Act and in the articles. In my view, a director cannot, by the instrument of a Power of Attorney, cede his legal authority, duties and responsibilities imposed by law to another except than in accordance with the provision of the Act. But even if were possible to cede the powers vested in the directorship of a Company, to a third party, through a Power of Attorney, it can only be personal, the exercise of which if purportedly on behalf of the Company, will need the sanction of the Company.”
In view of the approach, I have adopted, it will be at best a matter of academic interest only or at worst an exercise in futility to express my conclusion on the merits of the Plaintiff’s application for reinstatement.
Essentially, that is all I have to say!!!
(G) FINAL ORDERS
(1) The Plaintiff’s “Notice of Motion” dated 25th November 2015 is dismissed.
(2) The Plaintiff is ordered to pay costs of $500.00 (summarily assessed) to the third and fourth Defendants which is to be paid within 14 days hereof.
.......................................
Jude Nanayakkara
Master
At Lautoka
10th June 2016
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