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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
Civil Action No: 348 of 2003.
BETWEEN:
ATUNAISA LACABUKA RASOKI
lot 197, Makosoi Estate, Pacific Harbour – Secretary Nominated and Members of Land & Native Customary Fishing Right Owner
with support of three big Chiefs and Members; Secretary Mataqali Vunimli and Case 121/2000; Replacement Act 12/2002 and Registered
Officer – National Democratic Party.
PLAINTIFF
AND:
MR. MIKE McLEAN & GENERAL MANAGER or LOCATION MANAGER or ANACONDA II FILM COMPANY of Lagoon Resort Hotel, Pacific Harbour, Tikina of Deuba.
1ST DEFENDANT
AND:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FIJI AND MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS, MINISTRY OF FIJIAN AFFARS, FIJI VISUAL FILM COMMISSION of Victoria Parade, Suva.
2ND DEFENDANT
AND:
GENERAL MANAGER & LEGAL COUNSELLOR, NATIVE LAND TRUST BOARD; TRUSTEE OF NATIVE LAND AND FISHERIES COMMISSION ADVISOR of Victoria Parade, Suva.
3RD DEFENDANT
BEFORE : Master Deepthi Amaratunga
COUNSEL : Plaintiff appearing in person
Mr. Haniff F. Y. for the 1st Defendant
Mr. S. Sharma for the 2nd Defendant
Date of Hearing : 19th October, 2010
Date of Decision : 8th February, 2013
DECISION
'(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amend any pleading or the indorsement of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the indorsement, on the ground that-
(a) It discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; or
(b) It is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;
(c) It may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or
(d) It is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court; may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.'
"It is only plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule, per Lindley MR. in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1898] UKLawRpKQB 176; (1899) 1 Q.B. 86, p91(Mayor, etc., of the City of London v. Homer (1914) 111 L.T. 512, CA). See also Kemsley v. Foot and Qrs. (1951) 2KB. 34; (1951) 1 All ER. 331, CA. affirmed (1952) AC. 345, H.L. The summary procedure under this rule can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it obviously unsustainable' (Att-Gen. of Duchy of Lancaster v. L. & N.W. Ry. Co. [1892] UKLawRpCh 134; (1892) 3 Ch. 274, CA). The summary remedy under this rule is only to be applied in plain and obvious cases when the action is one which cannot succeedor is in some way an abuse of the process or the case unarguable (see per Danckwerts and Salmon L.JJ. in Nagle V. Feliden (1966) 2 Q.B. 633, pp. 648, 651, applied in Drummond Jackson v. British Medical Association (1970) 1 W.L.R. 688 (1970) 1 All ER 1094, CA).
Footnote 18/19/4 of the 1988 Supreme Court Practice, following is stated in relation to striking out applications:-
"On an application to strike out the statement of claim and to dismiss the action, it is not permissible to try the action on affidavits when the facts and issues are in dispute (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1. W.L.R. 1238; [1965] 2 All E.R. 87, CA).
It has been said that the Court will not permit a plaintiff to be 'driven from the judgment seat' except where the cause of action is obviously bad and almost incontestably bad (per Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Dyson v. Att.-Gen. [1910] UKLawRpKQB 203; [1911] 1 KB 410 p. 419
"The law with regard to striking out pleadings is not in dispute. Apart from truly exceptional cases the approach to such applications is to assume that the factual basis on which the allegations contained in the pleadings are raised will be proved. If a legal issue can be raised on the facts as pleaded then the courts will not strike out a pleading and will certainly not do so on a contention that the facts cannot be proved unless the situation is so strong that judicial notice can be taken of the falsity of a factual contention. It follows that an application of this kind must be determined on the pleadings as they appear before the court. In this case the Judge's task was made more difficult because a considerable amount of factual material was placed before him. We wish to point out that this is inappropriate and undesirable. The Judge's task was also made more difficult by the wording of both statements of claim and defence which do not raise the questions at issue with clarify."
'6(1) Subject to the provisions of this rule, and rules 9, 10, and 11, every pleading must contain, and contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defences, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved, and the statement must be as brief as the nature of the case admits.' (emphasis is added)
'Material facts, not evidence'- Every pleading must contain only a statement of the material facts on which the party pleading relies, and not the evidence by which they are to be proved (per Farwell L. J in N. W. Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali C Ltd [1913] 3K.B. 422,425). "The distinction is taken in the very rule itself between the facts on which the party relies, and the evidence to prove those facts (per Brett L.J. in Philipps v Philipps (1878) 4 Q. B. D. 133). All facts which tend to prove the fact in issue will be relevant at the trial, but they are not "material facts" for pleading purposes. "It is an elementary rule in pleading that, when a statement of facts is relied on, it is enough to allege it simply without setting the allegation" (per Lord Denman C.J. in Williams v Wilcox [1838] EngR 305; (1838) 8 A& E 314, p 331; and see Stuart v Gladstone (1879) 10 Ch. D. 644).....' (emphasis is added)
'It has become fashionable in these days to attach decreasing importance to pleadings, and it is beyond doubt that there have been times when an insistence on complete compliance with their technicalities put justice at risk, and, indeed, may on occasion have led to its being defeated. But pleadings continue to play an essential part in civil actions, and although there has been since the Civil Procedure Act 1833 a wide power to permit amendments, circumstances may arise when the grant of permission would work injustice or, at least, necessitate an adjournment which may prove particularly unfortunate in trials with a jury. To shrug off a criticism as 'a mere pleading point' is therefore bad law and bad practice. The purpose is to define the issues and thereby to inform the parties in advance of the case they have to meet and so enable them to take step to deal with it.'
'Need for compliance- These requirements should be strictly observed (per May L. J. in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1989] 1 W.L.R 1340 at 1352). Pleadings play an essential part in civil actions, and their primary purpose is to define the issues and thereby to inform the parties in advance of the case which they have to meet, enabling them to take steps to deal within it, and such primary purpose remains and can still prove of vital importance, and therefore it is bad law and bad practice to shrug off a criticism as a "mere pleading point"(see per Lord Edmund Davis in Farrell v Secretary of state for Defence [1980] 1 W.L.R 172 at 180, [1980]1 All E.R. 166 at 173)'. (emphasis is added)
'Facts must be material- The words "contain only" emphasize that only facts which are material should be stated in a pleading. Accordingly, statement of immaterial and unnecessary facts may be struck out (Davy v Garrett[1878] UKLawRpCh 8; (1878) 7 Ch.D. 473; Rossom v Budge [1893] UKLawRpKQB 56; [1893] 1 Q. B. 571; Murray v Epsom local Board [1896] UKLawRpCh 177; [1897] 1 Ch. 35; and see also r 19). Unless, however, statements are ambiguous or otherwise embarrassing, the Court as a rule will not inquire very closely into their materiality (Knowlers v Roberts [1888] UKLawRpCh 42; (1888) 38 Ch.D. 263 at 271; Tomkinson v S.E. Ry. C (No2)(1887) 57 L.T 358)'
'It has become fashionable in these days to attach decreasing importance to pleadings, and it is beyond doubt that there have been times when an insistence on complete compliance with their technicalities put justice at risk, and, indeed, may on occasion have led to its being defeated. But pleadings continue to play an essential part in civil actions, and although there has been since the Civil Procedure Act 1833 a wide power to permit amendments, circumstances may arise when the grant of permission would work in justice or, at least, necessitate an adjournment which may prove particularly unfortunate in trials with a jury. To shrug off a criticism as 'a mere pleading point' is therefore bad law and bad practice. The purpose is to define the issues and thereby to inform the parties in advance of the case they have to meet and so enable them to take step to deal with it.' (emphasis is added)
Dated at Suva this 8th day of February, 2013.
Master Deepthi Amaratunga
High Court, Suva
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