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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: HAA0002 OF 2004S
Between:
SOMAL SHIVNESH SHARMA
Appellant
And:
THE STATE
Respondent
Hearing: 20th February 2004
Judgment: 27th February 2004
Counsel: Mr. G. O’Driscoll for Appellant
Ms P. Madanavosa for State
JUDGMENT
The Appellant was convicted on one count of Driving a Motor Vehicle whilst under the influence of alcohol, on the 13th of October 2003. He was sentenced on the 10th of November 2003 to a fine of $1,000 (in default 3 months imprisonment) and disqualified from driving for 12 months. He now appeals against conviction and sentence.
The grounds of appeal are:
(1) That the learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself on the evidence by not giving any prudence to the Appellant’s contention that the regulations for breath test and analyses were not complied with.
(2) That the learned magistrate erred in law by not allowing the Appellant’s Counsel to mitigate on his behalf and proceeded to enter a sentence that was harsh and excessive as a result.
The Appellant was originally charged on two counts. They read as follows:
FIRST COUNT
Statement of Offence
DRIVING MOTOR VEHICLE WHILST UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRINKS OR DRUGS: Contrary to section 102 and 114 of Land Transport Act 1998.
Particulars of Offence
SOMAL SHIVNESH SHARMA s/o Akilesh Sharma on the 31st day of August, 2001 at Nausori in the Central Division drove a motor vehicle on Dilkusha road under the influence of drinks or drugs to such an extent as to have proper control of the said motor vehicle.
SECOND COUNT
Statement of Offence
DANGEROUS DRIVING: Contrary to section 98(1) and 114 of Land Transport Act 1998.
Particulars of Offence
SOMAL SHIVNESH SHARMA s/o Akilesh Sharma on the 31st day of August, 2001 at Nausori in the Central Division drove a motor vehicle on Dilkusha Road in a manner which was dangerous to the public having regards to the circumstances of the case.
On the 16th of October 2002, the Appellant pleaded guilty on Count 1 and not guilty on Count 2. On the 9th of January 2003, he was represented by counsel, pleas were re-taken and he pleaded not guilty on both counts. The trial commenced on the 11th of September 2003.
PC Esili Nadolo, gave evidence that on the 31st of August 2001 at 11.45pm he attended a report of an accident at Dilkusha Road, Nausori. He found a white vehicle registration number CP929 inside a drain. He called for the driver. The accused came forward and identified himself. PC Nadolo could smell alcohol on his breath. He gave the accused three options, to be examined by a police officer, a government doctor or a private doctor at his own expense. He chose to be tested by a Government doctor. The officer then drew a rough sketch plan which he tendered. He took the Appellant to the hospital where a doctor examined him and took urine, and blood samples. The Government Analyst found the Appellant’s blood alcohol level to be 131.7mg and urine alcohol level to be 115.4mg. The doctor concluded that the Appellant was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was incapable of having proper control of his vehicle.
Under cross-examination, the witness agreed that although he arrived at the scene at 12 midnight, he did not take the Appellant to the hospital until 1.45am. The reason for the delay was that there was risk that people would steal from the vehicle. The witness agreed that the vehicle had not been inspected by the Land Transport Authority, and that the Appellant had not been subjected to a breathalyser test.
PW2, DPC Vilikesa interviewed the Appellant under caution and also charged him. In his interview, the Appellant said that his friend had been driving the car that night and that the car broke down on the Dilkusha Road. The Appellant then sat in the driver’s seat to allow it to be “push-started.” The interview then reads:
“The car start then we came down the slope and I suppose to stop the car to change driver then I went on and some people was coming on the road and they want to cross and I tried to evade them but the car went over a pipe and tyre blew and I drove the vehicle to the drain.”
He admitted that he had drunk a “couple” of beers that night.
At the end of the prosecution case, counsel for the Appellant made a submission that there was no evidence of dangerous driving on Count 2. The Court agreed. The learned Magistrate found that the accused had not driven “in such a way that may cause havoc on the road or to other road users.” He also found that it was wrong to try a person for both dangerous driving and drink driving on the same facts and acquitted him on Count 2. He found a case to answer on Count 1.
The Appellant decided to give sworn evidence. He said that his car had got stuck at Dilkusha and it was push-started as a result of which it rolled down the hill. The tyre was struck by a galvanised pipe, it blew and the car landed in the drain. He could not steer it in time. Under cross-examination he said that he was driving the car when it fell into the drain. He agreed that he had drunk “a glass or two of alcohol, mixed with juice.”
Counsel for the Appellant submitted that there was no evidence that the Appellant was so drunk that he was incapable of driving, that the Appellant was charged wrongly under section 102 of the Land Transport Act and should have been charged under section 103 and that the result of the blood test was unacceptable because the Appellant had been detained for breath test for more than 30 minutes contrary to section 104(1)(c) of the Land Transport Act.
Judgment was delivered on 13th October 2003. The learned Magistrate accepted the opinion of the doctor who examined the Appellant and who concluded, on the basis of the Analyst’s report, that he was incapable of having proper control of a motor vehicle. He found that the Appellant had been in the driver’s seat at the time of the accident, and therefore had control of the vehicle for the purpose of the meaning of the word “driving.” He found that section 102 of the Land Transport Act replaced a similar provision in the old Traffic Act which required proof of drinking and of incapability. He held that the Appellant had been correctly charged and that his blood alcohol level was well above the prescribed limit. He said that there was increased public awareness that a high blood alcohol level will result in substantial impairment of a person’s ability to drive properly. He convicted the Appellant and on the 10th of November 2003, sentenced him to $1000 and disqualified him from driving for 12 months. On that day, the Appellant’s lawyer did not appear. Instead, Mr. Ram Chand appeared for Mr. O’Driscoll. Inexplicably, Mr. Chand was not asked to mitigate for the Appellant. Instead the court asked the Appellant to mitigate himself. He did so but there is nothing on the record to explain why the learned Magistrate decided to take this step.
Ground 1
The main submission made by counsel under this ground is that the blood test taken by the doctor and analysed by the Government Analyst did not comply with the 30 minute time limit under section 103 of the Land Transport Act.
Section 102(1) of the Land Transport Act provides:
“(1) A person who drives a motor vehicle or is in charge of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of the motor vehicle commits an offence and is liable on conviction to the prescribed penalty.”
Section 103(1) provides:
“(1) A person who –
(a) drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle or is in charge of a motor vehicle while more than the prescribed concentration of alcohol is present in his blood; or
(b) fails or refuses to undergo a breath test or breath analysis when required to do so by a police officer
commits an offence.”
Section 104 provides that a breath test or analysis may be conducted on any person in respect of whom section 102(2) applies. That sub-section relates to the police decision to forbid a person to drive and to order him to hand his keys over to the officer. Section 104(1)(a) provides:
“Provided that –
(a) no breath test or analysis shall be conducted after 2 hours have elapsed from the time the driver has been driving or in charge of the motor vehicle unless the breath test or analysis could not have been carried out earlier due to the condition of the driver;
(b) a person shall not be detained for the purposes of breath test or analysis for more than 30 minutes."
There are several reasons why section 103(a) did not apply to the Appellant in this case. Firstly, he was never subjected to a breath test or breath analysis. He was examined by a medical practitioner and he consented to a blood test. The two hour time limit given is in relation to a breath test, not a blood test. The 30 minute time limit refers to detention for the purpose of a breath test. The Appellant was not detained for the purpose of a breath test. He was detained for medical examination, in the course of which he agreed to a blood test.
Secondly, the Appellant is charged under section 102(1) of the Act. In order to prove that the Appellant was too drunk to drive, the police were not required to do a breath test, or even a blood test, at all. The court can conclude in any case under section 102(1) that all ingredients of the offence are proved from the Appellant’s behaviour after the accident and from his manner of driving. There is no detention time limit (other than that under the Constitution) for an offence under section 102(1) of the Act.
In the course of his submissions, counsel for the Appellant submitted that the result of the blood test was unreliable. The evidence was that the blood test was taken before the doctor concluded that the Appellant was too drunk to drive. It is not clear why the defence did not request to cross-examine the doctor, and why it consented to the medical report being tendered, if it disputed the conclusion reached by the doctor. However, it was a conclusion the trial Magistrate was entitled to reach. Further the doctor was entitled to reserve his opinion until he received the result of the blood analysis.
In Shiu Charan v. Reginam (1972) 18 FLR 114, Grant J considered the old offence of drunk driving (which has the same elements as the section 102 offence) and held that where the prosecution had led evidence of a lay witness who said that the appellant was drunk, and of a doctor who found the appellant too drunk to drive, the conviction was safe. Archbold (2003) Para 32.71 states:
“The prosecution must prove not only the influence of drink or drugs but also that proper control of the vehicle is impaired by drink or drugs (R v. Harkes 22 Cr. App. R. 172 (CA).) This may be shown by evidence of: (a) the manner of driving; (b) the driver’s physical condition; (c) the proportion of alcohol in a specimen of breath, blood or urine pursuant to section 15 of the RTOA 1988.”
Section 102 does not contain the equivalent of section 15 of the English legislation. However the principles outlined by Archbold apply here, except that in the case of (c), a court in Fiji should not assume that a blood/breath/urine test proves incapability without the taking and accepting of expert evidence in this regard. In this regard that the learned Magistrate appears to have concluded that the Appellant was too drunk to drive on the basis of public knowledge he was in error. However, the doctor’s expert opinion was before the court, and that was sufficient to convict.
In DPP v. Ben Tausia Crim. App. No. 5 of 1984 the Fiji Court of Appeal considered the kind of evidence capable of sustaining a conviction for the old offence of Drunk Driving. It adopted the following passage from a decision of Grant C.J. in R v. Chaudhary Cr. App. 95 of 1978:
“... the prosecution have to prove firstly, that the driver was under the influence of drink, on which the evidence of lay witnesses may be received; and secondly that he was under the influence of drink to such an extent as to be incapable of properly controlling the motor vehicle which may be established in a variety of ways, such as the manner of driving, or the circumstances of an accident, or the evidence of a duly qualified medical practitioner who has examined the driver and who, as an expert witness, is in a position to express an opinion that he was under the influence of drunk to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control.”
In Ben Tausia the appellate judge had allowed an appeal against conviction on the basis that there had been no expert evidence and no accident. But the Court of Appeal, in restoring the conviction said, at page 5:
“We accept the appellant’s submission that neither Davies nor Chaudhary attempts to chose the categories of evidence required to establish inability to drive. Neither case supports the proposition in law, put forward on behalf of the respondent, that a person facing this charge is entitled to an acquittal where there has been no accident and no medical examination.”
And at page 6:
“The basic principle however, is that it is for the Court eventually to decide, with the assistance of opinion evidence where experts are available or without it, on other admissible evidence, where they are not, whether the accused was unfit to drive. The evidence of an expert even of a doctor, need not necessarily be accepted (see Blackie v. Police [1965] NZHC 106; (1966) NZLR 409). Nor is there any rule of law that in the absence of medical opinion, a reasonable doubt must necessarily remain in cases where there has been no accident.”
In this case there was no evidence of manner of driving. The learned Magistrate appears to have accepted the Appellant’s defence of mechanical defect and therefore that there was no fault displayed by him. We are left therefore with the conclusion of the doctor, based on the blood analysis. Was the learned Magistrate entitled to accept this evidence alone, to convict? The authorities I have cited, say that he was.
The evidence of a doctor, who gives his opinion that a person is too drunk to drive, is the evidence of a professional expert whose opinion is rendered to assist the court (R v. Lanfear (1968) 2 QB 77). A lay witness may give evidence that the accused was drunk, but he cannot say that the accused was too drunk to drive. A medical practitioner can give that opinion, and a court can rely on that evidence to convict the accused even without any other evidence. In this case, the doctor’s opinion was tendered without dispute, the thrust of the defence being that there was no evidence of manner of driving. The lack of that evidence might have been fatal if the police had not obtained the doctor’s opinion. Further, the learned Magistrate also referred to the prescribed limit under section 103 of the Act to support his finding. As I have said, this latter finding could not have justified a conviction on its own. The court also needed to have the expert opinion of a doctor as to unfitness to drive or some other evidence to allow the court to infer unfitness from the manner of driving and the accused’s own conduct (for instance a staggering gait or a heavy smell of liquor). In this case there was no evidence of manner of driving but there was some evidence of the smell of liquor. In the circumstances the learned Magistrate was entitled to find the case proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ground 2
Counsel did not appear on the day of sentence. Instead he instructed Mr. Ram Chand to appear. However the court asked the Appellant to mitigate in person. I can only speculate as to the reason why. Perhaps Mr. Chand was not asked to mitigate. Perhaps he did not ask for more time to prepare for mitigation if he was not prepared. Perhaps the Appellant asked to mitigate in person. Whatever the reason, the practice of asking the accused to mitigate when he has counsel appearing for him is very unusual. It certainly warrants an explanation on the court record as to the reason why the learned Magistrate saw fit to break with the established practice of the Bar and Bench.
Despite this unusual occurrence, I note that the Appellant did mitigate, that Mr. Chand who is a senior member of the Bar obviously acquiesced in the proceedings, and that the sentence passed on the Appellant is well within the tariff for section 102 offences. For these reasons, the appeal against sentence is dismissed.
Conclusion
This appeal against conviction and sentence is dismissed.
Nazhat Shameem
JUDGE
At Suva
27th February 2004
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