(4) &nnbsp;;&nspp;nbsp;nbsp;&nbp; &nnbsp;;&nspp; span>A person convicted of an offence under this section shall, unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise,
and without prejudice to the power e cou ordeonger pger perioderiod of d of disqualification, be disqualified for a period of 12
months from the date of conviction from holding or obtaining a driving licence.
(5) & &nbp;&&nbp;;&nbpp; Any police officer icer may arrest without a warrant any person reasonably sued byof coing aence thision.”n> The section provides that the court must imat least a period of 12 months disqualification unless it finds special reasoreasons not to do so. It has powers to impose a lower period
of disqualification.
What are ‘special reasons’? In R -v- Crossen (1939) 1 NT 106 the King’s Bench Division of Northern Ireland held:
“A ‘special reason’ within the exception is one which is special to the facts of the particuase, that is special to theo the facts
which constitute the offence. It is, in other words, a mitigating or extenuating circumstance not amounting in law to a defence to
the charge, yet directly connected with the commission of the offence and one which the court ought properly to take into consideration
when imposing punishment. A circumstance peculiar to the offender as distinguished from the offence is not a ‘special reason’ within
the exception.”
This passage was approved by Lord Goddard in Whittal -v- Kirby (1946) 2 ALL ER 552 and has been ad by the courts in Fiji fori for many years.
Although the triviality of an offence would appear to satisfy the ‘special reasons’ test, Lord Widgery said in Nicholson -v- Brown (1974) RTR 177:
“I would not accept the proposition that if a man is guiltdriving without due care and attention, he can be excused esed endorsement
of his licence on the basis of special reasons merely because it was not a bad case, or merely because the degree of blameworthiness
was slight. I think that the line must be drawn firmly at guilt or innocence in those case. If the defendant is guilty, then the
consequences of endorsement of the licence must follow, unless there is some special reason properly to be treated as such, not such
a matter as that the offence is not a serious one.”
A perusal of decisions where special reasons been found, shows that they include the fact that the offender drove for only a short
distadistance and in circumstances such that he was unlikely to meet other road users (Coombs -v- Kehoe (1972) RTR 224), the fact that the offender was tricked into committing the offence, and the fact that the offender was driving in an emergency (Brown -v- Dyerson (1969) 1 QB 45. The fact that the offender’s family will suffer financial hardship if his licence is endorsed, was specifically held not to be a
special reason in Whittal -v- Kirby (supra).
There can be no question that the Appellant failed to show special reasons. Special reasons are special to the offence, not to the
offe The reasons raised by the the Appellant in his sworn evidence were not special reasons, and the learned Magistrate rightly
rejected them. He then imposed the minimum term of disqualification he could have imposed under section 39. The appeal against the
disqualification is therefore unsuccessful and is dismissed.
ass=MsoNormal stal style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> The lack of representation
There is no appeal against conviction. However counsel forAppellant submits that the prejudice to the Appellant as a result of lack
of representationation was that the prosecution did not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
The Appellant was unrepresented at the trial, but he was given ample opportunity, between the 15th of February 2000 and the 28th of
August 2000 to find a lawyer. Blame for the fact that he did not do so, cannot be laid at the Magistrate’s door.
In any event, I do not think that he was prejudiced by the lack of legal representation. The record shows that the Appellant’s crxamination
was both coherenherent and relevant. His defence emerged clearly from the nature of the cross-examination. His defence was firstly
that he was not drunk, secondly that if he was, he drank after the accident and thirdly that the accident occurred not because he
was careless but because someone jumped in front of his car.
Counsel submits that the offences were not made out on the evidence. However, the offences were proved on the Appellant’s own stateto
the police, on the basisbasis of the Analyst’s report which showed a high level of blood alcohol and on the basis of the doctor’s
evidence that the Appellant was under the influence of liquor to such an extent as to have improper control of his vehicle.
p class=MsoNormal stal style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> It is true that the police found the car without a driver. However in his cautiatement, the Appellant confessed to driving the car
and said said he had consumed alcohol some 6 hours before the incident. He gave sworn evidence which the Magistrate disbelieved.
He was entitled to do so.
In all the circumstances I find that the Appellant was not prejudiced by lack of legal representation, and that his trial was faionducted.
This ground is also dismissed.
Summary
 an>
This appeal against sentence is unsuccessful and is dismissed.
Nazhat Shameem
JUDGE
At Suva
2nd November 2001
Haa0077j.01s
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