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High Court of Fiji |
Fiji Islands - Tanuku v Attorney-General - Pacific Law Materials
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
CIVIL ACTION NO: HBC 134 OF 1995
BETWEEN:
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ESALA TANUKU
Plaintiff
AND:
 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Defendant
COUNSEL: No appearance for Plaintiff
Mr S.r for Defendant
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Hearing: 21st January 2000
Decision: 26th January 2000
DECISION
On 9th March 1995, the Plaintiff as “intended administrator in the estate of Peni Kasa Baleiwaigasa Waqanisau Tanuku” issued writ of summons against the Attorney-General, for negligence by government doctors at the Colonial War Memorial Hospital. The deceased, a 6 year old boy, and the Plaintiff’s son, died on 17th August 1992. The writ of summons states:
“The defendant through its servants and/or agents aforesaid were guilty of negligence and failed to use reasoncare, skill and diligence ince in and about the treatment and attendance of the deceased as a result of which he died.”
At paragraph 18 of the writ, the Plaintiff purports to bring the action under the Laorm (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Death and Interest) Act Capt Cap. 27 and the Compensation to Relatives Act Cap. 29. At paragraph 19 the Plaintiff purports to bring the action on behalf of himself as the deceased’s father, the deceased’s mother, and his three siblings. It is not known when letters of administration were granted to the Plaintiff (if they were) but the writ claims $500 for “taking out probate.”
The Attorney-General filed acknowledgement of servicd a statement of defence. The Defence does not refer to the Plaintiff’s standing.
Summons for Directions were issued on 12th July 1995. Documents were exchanged in September 1995. Nothing further was doneither Plaintiff or Defendafendant until 3rd January 2000, when an application for striking out the statement of claim, was made by the Defendant, on the ground that the Plaintiff had not brought the action as administrator of his son’s estate, that he was incompetent to bring the action, and that the entire proceedings were null and void.
This decision is in respect of that application.
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The application is made under Order 18 Rule 18 of the High Court Rules that the writ “discloses no reasonable cause of action.”
At the hearing of the application, Mr S. Kumar for the Defendant tendered written submissions. There was pearance for the Plaintiff.tiff.
p class=MsoNormal stal style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> In his written submission, Mr Kumar submitted the Plaintiff could not have instituted the action as an administrator before grant of letteletters of administration, and that if he was bringing the action on behalf of the deceased’s dependants, the requirements of section 10 of the Compensation to Relatives Act had not been satisfied.
It is clear since the decisions of the Privy Council and the Court of Appeal in Meyappa Chetty -v- Subarmani Chetty (1916) 1 AC 603 and Ingall -v- Moran (1944) 1 All ER 97 respectively, that an administrator can only institute an action after he gets his grant of letters of administration. In Ingall -v- Moran Scott LJ said in relation to a writ filed by the administrator a day before he was granted letters of administration:
“It is true that, when he got his title by the grant of administration, he prima facie became entitled to sue could have then issued a nd a new writ, but that was all. An application by him to treat the original writ .... as retrospectively valid from that date would have been refused by the Court, not only because it might prejudice existing rights of defence, but because it would not be permissible under the Rules of the Supreme Court or the Judicature Acts. The old writ was in truth incurably a nullity; it was born dead and could not be revived.”
It is clear therefore, that the writ filed in March 1995 by the Plaintiff as the “intended administrator” of his son’s estate cannot be valid if this was the only capacity in which the action was brought.
However, the Plaintiff purports also to bring the action as a dependent under section 10 of the Compensation to Relatives Act. Counsel for the Defendant submits that the dependants are not listed as parties and that no amendment should be entertained at this stage.
Section 10 of the Compensation to Relatives Act provides:
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“Where in any of the cases provided for bs Act it happens that there is no executor or administratorrator of the deceased person, or that there being such executor or administrator no action as hereinbefore mentioned is within six months after the death of the deceased as hereinbefore mentioned brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator, then such action may be brought by and in the names of all or any of the persons, if more than one, for whose benefit such action would have been if it had been brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator.
(2) Every action so brought shall be for the benefit of the same person or persons and shall be subject to the same procedure as nearly as may be as if it were brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator.”
The deceased’s father is undoubtedly a beneficiary of his son’s estate by virtue of section 6(1)(e) ofSuccession, Probate and Administration Act Cap. 60. Howeverwever, the writ itself is not issued by him as beneficiary of the estate, the reference to the writ being brought on behalf of the beneficiaries, is contained in paragraph 19 of the writ of summons.
Order 6 Rule 3 of the High Court Rules provides:
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“Before a writ is issued it must be indorsed -
(a) &nbbsp; where the plaintiesnties in a representative capacity, with a statement of the cahe capacity in which he sues.”
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The Supreme Court Practice (1997) at page 46, Para 6/3/1 states that this rule -
“.... requires the representative capacity, if any, of the plaintiff and the defendant to be indorsed on the writ before it is issue is the indorsement on the the writ and not the statement in the title which is mere description (Bowler -v- John Mowhem & Co. (1954) 1 WLR 1445.”
In this case, the indorsement on the writ, atgraph 1 states clearly:
ass=MsoNormal stal style="margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> “The Plaintiff is the intendministrator and is suing on behalf of his son’s estate, deceased who was born on the 17th 17th day of March 1986.”
Can this defect be rectified by amendment? Order 20 Rule 1 states that amendment withoute may not be effected in relation to an amendment which conh consists of an alteration of the capacity in which a party to the action sues or is sued. Order 20 Rule 5 allows for amendment with leave “to alter the capacity in which a party sues ... if the new capacity is one which that party had at the date of commencement of the proceedings or has since acquired.” The discretion to allow amendment exists even after the limitation period has expired (Order 20 Rule 5(2)).
No application for amendment has been made. Plaintiff’s counsel did not appear at the hearing of this application. Itot known whether the Plaintlaintiff is now administrator, or whether, he wishes to proceed under section 10 of the Compensation to Relatives Act. The last sign of activity from the Plaintiff was July 1995.
In the circumstances I find that the writ filed by the Plaintiff as “intended administrator” of his son’s estate is invalid. In thence of any application forn for amendment even after the Order 18 Rule 18 summons was served on counsel on 11th January 2000, I allow the Defendant’s application to strike out the statement of claim.
The Defendant has asked for costs. However, the Defendant made this application almost five years after the writ was filed, and long afocuments were exchanged by d by the parties. The grounds for this application should have been apparent to the Defendant when the writ was filed.
In the circumstances I make no order for costs.
Nazhat Shameem
1"> JUDGE
At Suva
26th January
Hbc0134d.95s
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