| Fiji Islands - The State v Bokini - Pacific Law Materials |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL
ACTION NO. HAM0032 OF 1998
EN:
:
THE STATE
Applicant
AND:
RATU OVINI BOKINI
Respondent
Nazhat em (Director ctor of Public Prosecutions) and K. WilkiWilkinson for the Applicant
Dr. M.S. Sahu Khan and M. Raza for the Respondent
Dates of Hearing: 1st and 2nd December 1998
Date of Ruling: 13th January 1999
RULING
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS
The Respondent is facing 32 Counts of Official Corruption contrary to Section 106(a) of the Penal Code and 32 alternative Counts of Fraudulent Conversion of Property contrary to Section 279(1)(c)(ii) of the Penal Code Cap. 17. All these charges first came before the Resident Magistrate's Court at Suva on 22nd November 1996.
On the 4th of September 1998 Sadal J. in The State v. Ratu Ovini Bokini Criminal Appeal No. HAA0009 of 1998 ordered that the case be remitted to the Magistrate's Court for preliminary inquiry to be held
without undue delay.
On 13th October 1998, the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr. K. Wilkinson applied under Section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Code Cap. 21 for the case to be heard in the High Court. There was no objection from the Defence and the Application was granted. The
Magistrate's Court ordered a preliminary inquiry to be held as soon as possible and this commenced before the Chief Magistrate on
16th November, 1998 when the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions appeared for the Prosecution and Dr. Sahu Khan appeared for the
accused (Respondent). The hearing proceeded for two days but was adjourned by consent of the Defence to the 23rd and 24th of November
1998 after the Court was informed that Mr. Wilkinson had injured his back and could not appear immediately.
The hearing then continued until the 25th of November when after an exchange between Mr. Wilkinson and the Chief Magistrate on the
question of whether a prosecution witness then giving evidence should be excluded from the court while legal argument took place,
the Chief Magistrate refused to hear the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions' application to have the witness excluded and ordered
the Deputy Director to be removed from the court and taken downstairs (i.e. to the Police Cells) to "cool off". The Chief
Magistrate made this order because he said Mr. Wilkinson had committed contempt of court.
Later in this ruling I will quote the exact passage as recorded in the transcript of proceedings referring to this episode and some
remarks of the Chief Magistrate which were deleted from the transcript by order of the Chief Magistrate which bear on the motion
now before me.
After five minutes the Chief Magistrate ordered the release of Mr. Wilkinson and asked him to resume his seat in the court.
Mr. Wilkinson then informed the court that he proposed to withdraw from the case at that stage to seek instructions whereupon the
Chief Magistrate delivered a statement purporting to justify the action he had taken. I shall refer to parts of this statement later.
Some ten minutes later the Director of Public Prosecutions appeared with counsel for the Defence before the Chief Magistrate in Chambers
and requested an adjournment of proceedings until the next day to enable her to consider the Prosecution's position. The request
was granted and on the morning of 30th of November the Director of Public Prosecutions moved a motion before the Chief Magistrate
that he transfer the further hearing of the preliminary inquiry to another Magistrate to be heard de novo.
The grounds given in support of the motion were:
(a) the general conduct of the case;
(b) the detention of State counsel in custody;
(c) the public perspective of perceived bias as evidenced in an affidavit of Razim Buksh a Fraud Investigator who had been present
throughout the committal proceedings before the Chief Magistrate.
An affidavit opposing the motion was sworn by the Respondent on the 27th of November.
On the 30th of November the Chief Magistrate delivered his Ruling in which he refused to disqualify himself and made the following
orders:
(i) Inquiry to continue tomorrow at 10.00 a.m.
(ii) P.W. 4 to make himself available. (This is a reference to a prosecution witness then giving evidence when the exchange between
Mr. Wilkinson and the Chief Magistrate occurred.)
(iii) Bail is extended to the accused.
On the 1st of December the Director of Public Prosecutions filed a Notice of Motion which is now before me for an order that the committal
proceedings in the Magistrate's Court be stayed until the determination of an appeal by the State to this Court against the order
of the Chief Magistrate.
The application is based on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to stay its own process and that consequently if the Court
has such power it must have the power also to stay proceedings in an inferior court.
The principal ground argued before me by the Applicant is that by allowing repeated attacks on the integrity of the Deputy Director
of Public Prosecutions and the Director of Public Prosecutions' office and by his committing Mr. Wilkinson to custody the Chief Magistrate
created an impression of bias on the mind of the reasonably informed observer. Further that by commenting on the evidence of State
witnesses "criss-crossing", meaning presumably contradicting themselves, the court gave a clear impression that it had
decided on the effect of such contradictions.
One such example occurred on Day 4 at pages 65, 66 and 67 of the transcript, especially on page 66 where the Chief Magistrate said,
"So be it if you want to destroy your own witnesses ... there must be sufficient evidence to put this man on trial and if the
Crown's witnesses are coming in with the evidence that are criss-crossing, it may be fatal ... I'm sorry I've got to comply with
the law." I will give further examples of the alleged apparent bias of the Chief Magistrate later.
In his submissions counsel for the Respondent denies that this court has any inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay, let alone entertain
an appeal from the Chief Magistrate's ruling before the inquiry is completed. It is said, quoting, various authorities, that interlocutory
appeals in criminal proceedings are rarely allowed and are inimical to the judicial process. It is further submitted that in view
of the fact that the inquiry has only on counsel's estimate another two days to run before the Chief Magistrate gives his decision
on whether to commit the Respondent for trial it would be a waste of public money for this court to intervene at this stage. If the
parties are dissatisfied with the court's decision they can appeal to this court so that everything is disposed of in one proceeding.
It is further argued that the public confidence in the judicial system would be seriously affected if the public saw that a new inquiry
before another Magistrate could occur when almost 90 percent of the present inquiry is completed and if a fresh inquiry could be
ordered as a result of a scene between counsel and the court. It is said that the effect would be that every time there was a ruling
with which one side disagreed and a stay was granted, the result would be to cause chaos in our legal system. Finally this court
would be setting a very dangerous precedent because no injustice would be done to the Prosecution.
THE HEARING BEFORE THE CHIEF MAGISTRATE
Normally the record or transcript of proceedings in a lower court is a useful guide to a superior court reviewing the proceedings
in the lower court or hearing an appeal from them. That is only partly true of the transcript in the instant case because the Chief
Magistrate for reasons best known to himself has deleted from the transcript certain exchanges between the Deputy Director of Public
Prosecutions and counsel for the Respondent and between the Deputy Director and the Chief Magistrate, the effect of which is to favour
the Respondent. I shall give details in a moment but first, a general observation that it is clear to me reading the transcript and
listening to the tapes of it which I have done to ascertain the way in which the proceedings were conducted and the omissions made
by the Chief Magistrate, that the Chief Magistrate failed to exercise proper control of his court. Personal attacks on the qualifications
and integrity of Mr. Wilkinson and the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions were made by counsel for the Respondent without
any reprimand and call for withdrawal of the allegations by the Chief Magistrate. He stated a number of times during the hearing
that he desired to protect the dignity of his court but by allowing such personal comments to be made by counsel for the Respondent
in fact failed to do so.
There is no place in a court of law for insults and sarcastic remarks to be made by one counsel against another. When and if such
attacks are made the presiding judicial officer has a clear duty to intervene and reprimand the offending counsel for making such
comments. It is no answer in my judgment for a presiding Judge or Magistrate to wait for counsel the subject of the remarks to object.
The court itself must take the initiative to maintain its authority and preserve the dignity of the court. Proceedings in any court
must be conducted with due decorum and I regret to have to record my view that in this case too often the Chief Magistrate failed
to carry out that long-followed tradition and practice of the law. I shall now give details of this.
On Day 1 when the Chief Magistrate was reading to the Respondent Count No. 11 the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions objected
to a Mr. Grahame Southwick giving instructions to counsel for the Respondent, an objection which in my opinion was perfectly legitimate
and indeed held so by the Chief Magistrate. Counsel for the Respondent used among others the following words: "I am absolutely
amazed at such a ridiculous comment from the Prosecution. Why shouldn't he? What's wrong with it? What's paining in my learned friend's
neck for him to suggest that? It is (the most) ridiculous thing I have heard in my 34 years' experience. What's his motive? Nobody
can stop me. What motive does he have to make such a ridiculous and stupid comment?"
The Chief Magistrate did not rebuke counsel for the Respondent as he should have for referring to his opponent in such terms but ruled
correctly that no member of the public had a right to approach counsel at the Bar Table.
This and the following comment by Dr. Sahu Khan are not recorded in the transcript.
Dr. Sahu Khan then said, "If my learned friend would keep his mouth shut when I am talking and not play hide and seek game".
Quite properly the Chief Magistrate said that he hoped to conduct the proceedings so as to uphold the dignity of the court but his
duty lay not only there but also to reprimand Dr. Sahu Khan for the language he used which has no place in a court of law.
On Day 2 at page 58 counsel for the Respondent stated "What up sets me is that the Prosecution has been misleading us, misleading
this court and now they realise their short-comings and they want to plug those short-comings through the backdoor."
Further allegations of this nature were made by counsel for the Respondent against the Deputy Director which are not recorded in the
transcript. These relate to the alleged omission of four lines from a statement made by the Respondent to the Police. The tapes record
part of this comment by counsel as follows:
Dr. Sahu Khan: "The court and I have been misled. It is a very very strange coincidence that the part favourable to the accused
has been omitted from the document No. 68(4)."
Mr. Wilkinson did protest at these statements and said that three lines had been inadvertently omitted from the photocopy given to
Dr. Sahu Khan.
Once again there was no reprimand forthcoming from the Chief Magistrate to counsel making these offensive allegations against his
opponent.
On Day 3 at page 27 Dr. Sahu Khan alleged that the Prosecution was creating evidence - again no rebuke from the Chief Magistrate.
Similarly on Day 4 at page 55 there is another allegation by the Defence counsel that the Prosecution was misleading the court and
yet again the Chief Magistrate failed to reprimand Defence counsel. On Day 4 at page 67 counsel for the Respondent interrupted the
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions while he was addressing the court, Mr. Wilkinson objected and said this was second time that
had happened. Yet again the Chief Magistrate failed to reprimand counsel for the Respondent.
ACCUSED (RESPONDENT) AT THE BAR TABLE
The transcript records no application or order for the Respondent to sit at the Bar Table. However an affidavit sworn by Mr. Wilkinson
on the 30th of November 1998 indicates that counsel for the Respondent made no such application but that the court saw itself directed
the Respondent to sit at the Bar Table.
The law on this is quite clear and is that only in exceptional circumstances will an accused be allowed to sit at the Bar Table. The
Bar Table is reserved as the name indicates for counsel and instructing solicitors involved in a case. The dock is the place by long
tradition reserved for an accused person and it is no use in my judgment for counsel for the Respondent to say that it is now archaic.
It would be a sorry day in my opinion for this practice to be discontinued because I am strongly of the view that it is necessary
for the orderly conduct of proceedings in the criminal courts. For the Chief Magistrate to allow the Respondent to sit next to his
counsel without first asking for comments from the Prosecutor was in my judgment clearly wrong and could be construed by the ordinary
reasonable member of the public as apparent bias towards the Respondent.
THE DETENTION OF THE PROSECUTOR
This occurred on the last day of evidence in the hearing and is recorded but only in part at pages 8 and 9 of the transcript of the
25th of November 1998. The detention in custody of Mr. Wilkinson followed an exchange between Mr. Wilkinson and Dr. Sahu Khan in
which the Chief Magistrate intervened. The transcript records that counsel for the Respondent asked one State witness to comment
on the evidence of another. The Deputy Director objected. Counsel for the Respondent then made certain submissions during which the
Deputy Director asked that the witness be sent out of court since Defence counsel was canvassing the evidence of a previous witness,
a perfectly legitimate objection in my judgment. The Chief Magistrate refused to listen to Mr. Wilkinson and told him to sit down.
Mr. Wilkinson then replied that his objection was not interruption but a point of procedure.
The transcript then records the following:
"Mr. Wilkinson: My learned friend wants to make submissions at the end or whatever. He can do so, but to put it to this witness
what was said to another witness, and have him comment on it, is not even in cross-examination an appropriate role.
Dr. Sahu Khan: I am not asking him to comment on that. All I am going to ask him, that if it has been suggested to a witnesses that
he did belong, that would be a lie. That's all I want to know.
Mr. Wilkinson: He's asking a comment.
C/M Temo: What are you trying to get out Mr. Khan? I take this credibility or what?
Dr. Sahu Khan: Yes, Sir because obviously my learned friend has posed this question to Mr...... [interrupted by Mr. Wilkinson].....
Mr. Wilkinson: Sir, I object to this.
C/M Temo: No, I want to listen to the defence first.
Mr. Wilkinson: Yes, I know you do Sir.
C/M Temo: No, hang on, sit down Mr. Wilkinson. We must go through procedure. Let me listen to the defence first, then I will ask for
your reply. Please sit down and let me listen to the defence first.
Mr. Wilkinson: Sir, all I am asking for .....
C/M Temo: Could you please sit down? I haven't finished listening to the defence. Could you please sit down? Let me listen to the
defence first before you answer.
Mr. Wilkinson: It's a point of procedure Sir. I am just asking that the witness be .....[interrupted by C/M]
C/M Temo: Let me tell you this, I am warning you counsel, that I might do you for contempt, for disobeying court orders. My job is
to control proceedings and make sure that everyone's rights are heard.
Mr. Wilkinson: That's why I want the witness excluded.
C/M Temo: Well, at the moment I am listening to the defence lawyer. After then, I will ask you to reply. All I am asking you is to
please sit down, so that I could listen to the defence point of view.
Mr. Wilkinson: I understand that Sir but I am asking that the witness not listen to the question.
C/M Temo: Could you please take him downstairs for contempt of court. Take him downstairs for contempt of court for five (5) minutes.
Let him go and cool down downstairs.
Mr. Wilkinson: Sir, this is the point.
C/M Temo: Take him downstairs. I'll take a five (5) minutes break, you go downstairs right now for disobeying my orders. Take him
downstairs, five (5) minutes downstairs. Cool down downstairs and after five (5) minutes, bring him up here. I'll take a five (5)
minutes break."
The transcript however fails to record the additional remarks of the Chief Magistrate which were as follows as recorded on the tapes:
"You go downstairs right now. Take him downstairs. Take him downstairs. Drag him downstairs. Come on. Take him downstairs. Five
minutes."
For any Magistrate, let alone the Chief Magistrate of this country to use the expression "drag him downstairs" is simply
appalling.
It was this incident coupled with others I have enumerated which led to the application by the Director of Public Prosecutions for
the Chief Magistrate to disqualify himself and to the present motion before me. Significantly in my opinion this passage was omitted
by the Chief Magistrate when editing the transcript and I regret to have to say that I regard it as an attempt to mislead this court.
THE CHIEF MAGISTRATE'S RULING
Although he had received submissions from the Director of Public Prosecutions on the test to be applied where bias is alleged against
a judicial officer the Chief Magistrate in his ruling ignored these submissions. The Director emphasised in her submission that the
issue was not whether the Chief Magistrate was biased in fact but whether the circumstances of the case would lead an informed observer
to consider there was an apprehension of or a real danger of bias.
In her submission the Director referred to the test for bias in Fiji as considered by the Supreme Court in Amina Koya v. The State Criminal Appeal No. CAV0002/97. The Court considered the English test which poses the following question: "is there real danger
or real likelihood of bias", against the Australian test which is "whether there is a reasonable apprehension or suspicion
of bias."
In Koya the Supreme Court said:
".... there is little if any difference between asking whether a reasonable and informed person would consider there was a real
danger of bias and asking whether a reasonable and informed observer would reasonably apprehend or suspect bias. ...... In the determination
of that ground the record of the trial, showing how it was conducted by the trial judge, is of fundamental importance."
The test is therefore whether all the circumstances of the case including the conduct of the case would lead an informed reasonable
observer to believe that the tribunal was biased. In his ruling the Chief Magistrate did not refer to these tests at all. In fact
he seems to have been of the view at page 11 that since he was not biased in fact he should not disqualify himself. He said "The
Court's mind is not closed."
In my judgment it is clearly arguable that the manner of the removal of the Deputy Director from the court was likely to create an
impression in reasonable members of the public present in the court that, to use the time-honoured Australian expression, the Chief
Magistrate did not give Mr. Wilkinson a fair go and as such in my view could give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the
minds of the ordinary and informed members of the public present at the hearing.
This view is reinforced by the passage I quoted earlier at pages 66 and 67 of the transcript and in my view was likely to give a distinct
impression of pre-judgment before the court had heard all the evidence. Contradictions between witnesses are common-place in our
courts and for the Chief Magistrate to say "It may be fatal" in my view could easily lead the informed observer to conclude
that the court had already decided that these contradictions were fatal.
Reading the transcript I am left with the impression that frequently the Chief Magistrate forgot that he was conducting only a preliminary
inquiry, of which he was reminded on a number of occasions by the Deputy Director.
Before dealing with the question whether the Deputy Director was properly and lawfully detained I must comment on an affidavit by
the Respondent sworn on the 27th of November 1998. How most of this affidavit was ever admitted by the Chief Magistrate is beyond
me. It is full of self-serving statements and opinions on the law and of hearsay.
Mr. Bokini several times states that he was shocked and stunned at the behaviour of the Deputy Director and says in paragraph 19 "one
could not believe that a lawyer could show such disrespect to the Court". Paragraph 20(f) must be quoted in full.
"That after Mr. Wilkinson was taken away, the court was adjourned for five minutes and it was then that the majority of the members
of the public who were sitting in the Court said to my Counsel and in my presence that they were horrified to see how a lawyer could
show such disrespect to the Court and they felt the respect for Judiciary was at stake and if a lawyer can get away with such behaviour
then what could be expected from a non lawyer and that such behaviour could encourage members of the public to show such disrespect
to the Court."
Likewise and in similar vein sub-paragraph (h).
"That I was shocked and dismayed to hear application made by the Director of Public Prosecutions that the Learned Chief Magistrate
should disqualify himself because of the incident and because he exercised his powers against the Counsel who just happened to be
the Counsel for the Prosecution."
It is arguably very significant in my opinion that the Respondent expresses no horror or dismay or shock at the insults directed by
his own counsel against the Deputy Director nor at the Chief Magistrate's use of the expression "drag him downstairs".
In my view it is clear beyond any doubt that Mr. Wilkinson was wrongly sentenced for contempt of court. It has been said time and
again that the "summary power of punishing for contempt should be used sparingly and only in serious cases", to quote the
Privy Council judgment in Izuora v. The Queen (1953) AC 327. More recently in his excellent judgment in Elizabeth Rice and Others v. Syed Mukhtar Shah Criminal Appeal No. HAA002 of 1997 Townsley J. said at page 69:
"If the Respondent had made himself aware of the history of the law of contempt, as it has developed in England, he would have
seen that summary process for contempt even by superior Court judges was heartily discouraged and warned against. The whole emphasis
of the law has been that prosecution for contempt be left to the proper authorities such as the Attorney General, the DPP or the
police"............
This of course presumes that before any person can be dealt with for contempt of court it is important that the court tell the alleged
offender distinctly what the contempt is said to have been and then hear submissions from the alleged contemnor or, if he is represented,
from his counsel. In R. v. Moran 81 Cr. App. R. 51 the English Court of Appeal set down certain principles to be borne in mind in contempt cases, three of which in my view apply particularly
to the present proceedings. They are cited in the 1998 edition of Archbold at paragraph 28-117 as:
"(a) The decision to imprison a person for contempt should never be taken too quickly. There should always be time for reflection
as to what is the best course to take.
(b) The judge should consider whether that time for reflection should extend overnight.
(d) Giving a contemnor an opportunity to apologise is one of the most important aspects of the summary procedure."
It is clear in my view from the transcript and the tapes that these principles were ignored by the Chief Magistrate.
There is one further matter to which I must refer before dealing with the submissions I have received on the motion. That is the inference
of possible racial insensitivity by the Chief Magistrate which in my opinion can arguably be drawn from his conduct of the proceedings.
At page 28 of the transcript of the 24th of November counsel for the Respondent in answer to an objection by Mr. Wilkinson went into
a discussion about Fijian customs. He said this at the beginning of his remarks:
"I wish my learned friend could read about something the customs, culture of people of Fiji and especially the Fijian regulations.
What a tikina is, what a mataqali is, what a vanua is. I think he will go very far to understand what I am saying is, Sir."
In my judgment those remarks were offensive to the Deputy Director but went unrestrained by the Chief Magistrate when they should
have been restrained.
The Chief Magistrate's oft-repeated reference to "OUR Constitution", his emphasised reference to the Respondent as ....
"a citizen of this country" and his constant refusal to reprimand counsel for the Respondent for his unsubstantiated accusations
and insulting personal remarks directed at the Australian representative of the State when combined with the order that Mr. Wilkinson
be "DRAGGED DOWNSTAIRS" could give rise in the mind of an ordinary man to a suspicion of racial insensitivity by the Chief
Magistrate.
For these reasons I consider that the conduct of the Chief Magistrate very arguably could give rise in the mind of a reasonable informed
observer of the proceedings to apprehension of bias towards the Deputy Director by the Chief Magistrate. The question now is whether
I have the right to grant a stay.
COMMENTS ON THE SUBMISSIONS AND CONCLUSION
I do not intend here to refer to the many cases which were cited to me by the Applicant and the Respondent on the question of whether
this court has jurisdiction to grant the order sought in the Notice of Motion. I am satisfied that I have that jurisdiction. In his
judgment in The State v. Waisale Rokotuiwai Criminal Case No. HAC0009 of 1995 delivered on the 31st of March 1998 Pain J. had to consider whether the inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court could equally be invoked in its criminal jurisdiction as in its civil jurisdiction. At page 8 of his decision Pain
J. quoted the following extract from the speech of Lord Devlin in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1964) A.C. 1254 at 1347:
"My Lords, in my opinion, the judges of the High Court have in their inherent jurisdiction, both in civil and in criminal matters,
power (subject of course to any statutory rules) to make and enforce rules of practice in order to ensure that the court's process
is used fairly and conveniently by both sides."
".......... a general power, taking various specific forms, to prevent unfairness to the accused has always been a part of the
English criminal law,......."
".......... nearly the whole of the English criminal law of procedure and evidence has been made by the exercise of the judges
of their power to see that what was fair and just was done between prosecutors and accused."
I respectfully adopt that passage and say that if the High Court has power to stay its own process, even more so it has the power
to stay proceedings in an inferior court. Much was made by Dr. Sahu Khan in his submissions of the decision of the Court of Appeal
in Ramesh Patel v. The State Cr. App. Nos AAU0017 of 1996 and AAU0001 of 1997 delivered on the 18th of July 1997. There the court held that an appeal either to
the High Court or to the Court of Appeal in criminal matters can only be taken against a final order or determination of the Magistrate's
Court. It was submitted to me that the order made by the Chief Magistrate could not be construed as final and that consequently I
have no jurisdiction to entertain the present application.
I have two comments to make on that submission, first in my view the order of the Chief Magistrate was not interlocutory but final.
At page 11 of his ruling he states that he makes the orders I have previously quoted earlier in this ruling. Secondly, if I am wrong
in that view, I consider the matter has been put beyond any doubt now by an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code which came into force on the 17th of September 1998. Section 8(8) of the Amending Act amends Section 308 of the Criminal procedure
Code and states:
"An order by a court in a case may be the subject of an appeal to the High Court, whether or not the court has proceeded to a
conviction in the case."
In my judgment those words are sufficiently wide to justify my holding that first I have jurisdiction to entertain the present motion
and secondly that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions against the Chief
Magistrate's ruling.
I only add that I have read all the authorities cited to me by counsel and which are annexed to this Ruling. I consider those cited
by the Applicant are more persuasive than those cited by the Respondent, most of which are distinguishable on their facts from those
in the instant case.
The Applicant has satisfied me that the committal proceedings in the Magistrate's Court must be stayed until the determination of
the State's appeal against the order of the Chief Magistrate made on the 30th of November 1998 refusing an order for disqualification
and transfer of the hearing de novo to another Magistrate and I so order.
JOHN E. BYRNE
JUDGE
Legislation and authorities referred to in Ruling:
Criminal Procedure Code Cap. 21.
Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1998.
Amina Koya v. The State Criminal Appeal No. CAV0002/97.
Izuora v. The Queen (1953) AC 327.
Elizabeth Rice and Others v. Syed Mukhtar Shah Criminal Appeal No. HAA002 of 1997 - unreported judgment of Townsley J.
The State v. Waisale Rokotuiwai Criminal Case No. HAC0009 of 1995 - unreported judgment of Pain J. dated 31st March 1998.
Ramesh Patel v. The State Criminal Appeal Nos. AAU0017 of 1996 and AAU0001 of 1997 - unreported judgment of Court of Appeal dated 18th July 1997.
The following additional cases and legislation were referred to in argument:
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1997 of the Republic of Fiji Islands.
Grassby v. The Queen [1989] HCA 45; (1989) 168 CLR 1.
Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1961) AC 184.
Pinson v. Pinson 5 PRNZ 177.
Vakauta v. Kelly [1989] HCA 44; (1989) 167 CLR 568.
Webb v. The Queen [1994] HCA 30; (1993-1994) 181 CLR 41.
The State v. Jamuna Prasad Criminal Appeal No. HAA0028 of 1995 - unreported decision of Pain J. dated 22nd November 1995.
Regina v. Collins (1970) 1 Q.B. 710.
Regina v. Jefferies (1969) 1 Q.B. 120.
Mohammed Khalil v. The State Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 1991 - unreported decision of the Chief Justice dated 5th September 1991.
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