IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
At Suva
Appellate Jurisdiction

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 82 OF 1992

Between:

PADDY DAVID HOLLIS
Appellant

- and -

THE STATE
Respondent

Mr. J. Semisi for the Appellant
Mr. J. Naigulevu for the Respondent

JUDGMENT

On the 12th of August 1992 the appellant was convicted on his guilty plea to various related traffic offences and was fined a total of $50 and disqualified from driving for a period of 12 months.

The facts outlined by the prosecution was as follows: 

"On the day accused was driving bus CH384 at Grantham Road. When checked bus had no licence and also no Third Party Insurance."

The appellant initially lodged an appeal against both his conviction and sentence but at the hearing of the appeal counsel for the appellant indicated that he was no longer pursuing the appeal against conviction and would confine himself to the sentence of disqualification passed by the Magistrate Court.

It may be noted that the appellant was charged and convicted of an offence of Driving an Uninsured Motor Vehicle: contrary to Section 4(1)(2) of the Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act (Cap. 177). Such an offence carries a mandatory disqualification of 12 months "... unless the Court for Special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise".

In this latter regard the magistrate court record reveals that the learned trial magistrate very properly adjourned the case for the appellant "to show any special reason as to why he should not be disqualified" and after hearing the appellant on oath the learned trial magistrate ruled that no special reason had been shown.

The nature of the appellant's evidence before the trial magistrate was to the effect that he was the Transport Manager of a bus company and was required to test drive company vehicles as part of his duties. He did not however know the law about the bus having to have Third Party.

Learned Counsel for the appellant (who did not appear in the Magistrate Court) sought to raise "Special reasons" on the basis that the primary responsibility for ensuring that a vehicle was properly covered by a valid third party policy of insurance lay with the "owner" of the vehicle and an employee of such owner was entitled to assume that his employer (the owner of the vehicle) would have properly complied with the law. 

No authority has been cited for the above propositions although counsel had undertaken to furnish the Court with an authority.

Be that as it may I cannot accept that 'the Act' which is clearly intended for the protection of road users, whether they be pedestrians or passengers should be so read as to restrict its application to 'registered owners' of uninsured motor vehicles.

It might be that prosecuting authorities ought as a first option normally to enforce 'the Act' against the 'registered owner' of an uninsured motor vehicle but that is an entirely different matter from saying that that is what is stated or intended by 'the Act'.

In Rennison v. Knowler (1947) 1 ALL E.R. Lord Goddard in considering the question of 'belief' as a 'special reason' said at p.304: 

"Belief, however honest, cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as a special reason unless it is based on reasonable grounds."

and later in the same judgment: 

"We cannot hold that a belief founded on no reasonable grounds can constitute a special reason. Considering that he never even asked the question we cannot possibly accept his belief on this matter as a special reason."

That is not to say however that in a proper case a Court would not find 'special reason' in circumstances where an employee was told by his employer to drive an uninsured motor vehicle such as occurred in Blows v. Chapman (1947) 2 All E.R. 576 in which Singleton J. said at p.577.

"In the case before us the respondent was a workman who had driven tractors for his employer for many years without complaint. On the day on which he was seen by the police he was driving a tractor which was not covered by insurance. He did not know. He was in my view, entitled to assume that his employer had complied with the law ... It is not I think, the duty of the workman to ask his employer each day: "Is this vehicle insured ?"

The circumstances in this case are materially different from those obtaining in the above decisions. Here there was no question of a 'reasonable belief' on the part of the appellant when he drove his employer's bus, nor having regard to the nature of his position and sworn testimony ought this Court to accept that he was 'entitled to assume' due compliance on the part of his employer.

Very simply, the appellant did not know that a 'policy of insurance' was required and such ignorance of the law can never be an excuse much less can it amount to a 'special reason'.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

(D.V. Fatiaki)
JUDGE
At Suva,
8th March, 1993.
HAA0082J.92S